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Abstract 
 
After the Second World War, Dutch authorities received the first demands for 
restitution and compensation from Dutch Jews for property losses. This thesis, based 
mainly on previously unexamined archives, is centred on a case study of six Jewish 
entrepreneurs in Amsterdam who had to battle with a bureaucratic government, 
guilt-evading confiscators, and their own trauma to gain compensation. 
  It presents new factors that determined the likelihood of successful restitution. 
Firstly, the characteristics of the confiscators who owned the properties during the 
war often determined the restitution process. If the administrator (Verwalter) in 
control of the propery was German or an obvious Dutch collaborator, the issue could 
be settled relatively quickly. If the administrator had sold the property during the 
war, however, this could create various problems for the Jewish families in search of 
justice. Secondly, the size of the Jewish company made a difference. Larger 
companies had more assets and thus better access to skilled legal services, which 
often ensured a speedier outcome.   
I want to acknowledge Jeffrey Daniels, Mandy Gavrielle Losk, the sisters Luijk and 
my loving family for all their ideas, critical comments and support.  
 
Dedicated to the memory of all those who perished. I will try to keep the past alive.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Question 
The speed of creating memories and sharing memories cannot be measured in days, but in 
hours or even minutes.1 
The quote above would befit an advertisement for a new gadget; however, far from a 
new marketing slogan, it constitutes the conclusion of research conducted by David 
Nieborg. Today’s world is vastly different to that of even a few decades ago. Physical 
reality has in many ways been usurped by emergent digital realities, which become 
more and more a part of everyday life. The Dutch Memorial Committee asked 
Nieborg to draw up a plan on how to engage future generations in commemorations 
of historical events, in order to keep certain memories alive. His conclusion was clear. 
In order to secure participation from society in future memorials, online platforms 
constitute an essential tool. 
Earlier Critique 
This was not the first time that the Dutch Memorial Committee had advocated the 
necessity of online commemoration. In 2013, they commissioned a related research 
project related to the memory of the Second World War.2 Therein, a plan combining 
war monuments and the digital world was presented. The project resulted in the 
construction of new online platforms to honor and remember historical events. This 
digitization guarantees ‘accessibility to online commemoration on different social 
																																								 																				
1 D.B. Nieborg, #Herdenken #Vieren en #Herinneren in het digitale tijdperk (Amsterdam 2015) 44. 
2 Nationaal Vrijheidsonderzoek 2013 Het Nationale 4 en 5 Mei Comité. 
<http://www.4en5mei.nl/onderzoek/toegepast_onderzoek/nationaal_vrijheidsonderzoek> Link: National 
Freedom Research (Last consulted on 27 February 2017). 
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platforms’.3 The results of the study were met with positive and negative reactions. 
On the one hand, it was argued that online platforms enable new generations to 
access the monuments online, thus making history more accessible for everyone.4 On 
the other hand, comments were made that these kinds of representations could lead 
to a flat, linear and chronological interpretation of historical events. In other words, 
the websites would be an inadequate portrayal of specific aspects of the war period 
and its victims.5 In the past, musea always had to pick a certain narrative to help 
people to commemorate.6  Nowadays online environments provide public spaces 
where multiple personal remembrances can be added.7  Nevertheless, Nieborg states 
that the possibilities are not completely utilized. Therefore, he concludes his report 
with the recommendation that future online platforms should have a broader scope 
and include more actors and time periods.8 
Recent Projects 
Several projects have since followed the most recent attempt of the Dutch Memorial 
Committee to provide guidelines for creating online platforms. The first of these 
projects was the ‘Jewish monuments’ project. The foundations of this project date 
back to 2006 when an online project was launched. However, in response to the 
earlier mentioned critiques, the initiators added thematic articles, in which they 
																																								 																				
3 Eindrapport: van ambitie naar gezamenlijke meerjarige uitvoeringsplan Commissie versterking infrastructuur 
herinnering WOII (Amsterdam 2015) 11. <file:///Users/hwallage/Downloads/blg-788099.pdf>  
Link: Supervisory report (Last consulted on 6 March 2017). 
4 K. Veale, ‘FCJ-014 Online Memorialisation: The Web As A Collective Memorial Landscape For Remembering 
The Dead’, The Fibreculture Journal 3 (2004) 1-18. 
5 Ibid., 8. 
6 A. Goldberg, ‘The ‘’Jewish narrative’’ in the Yad Vashem global Holocaust museum’, Journal of Genocide Research 
14:2 (2012) 187-213. 
7 L. M. C. Faro, ‘The Digital Monument to the Jewish Community in the Netherlands: a meaningful, ritual place 
for commemoration’, New Review of Hypermedia and Multimedia 21:1-2 (2015) 165-184, 180. 
8 Nieborg, #Herdenken, 6. 
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introduced new actors to the website.9 These thematic articles elaborate upon the life 
of diamond workers, Jewish doctors and market traders. However, the website still 
only focusses on the Jewish victims during the Second World War and does not give 
any information on the pre- or post-war period. 
My involvement in a new project 
A new platform will be established in 2018 named ‘Jewish houses’.10 The purpose of 
this endeavor is to map the Jewish houses in pre-war Amsterdam and create an 
online platform where people can experience a two-dimensional virtual tour through 
Jewish Amsterdam before the Second World War. In response to the earlier criticism 
that there is currently a poor representation of history digitally, I was asked by the 
project’s founders to improve their platform. I am doing so by adding a new actor. In 
my thesis, I will provide six case studies about Jewish entrepreneurs in Amsterdam 
before, during and after the Second World War. The stories of these six 
entrepreneurs will be shown on the website of Joodse Huizen.  
Reducing Criticism 
Jewish entrepreneurs in pre-war Amsterdam are an interesting research topic since 
the city was a thriving center for Jewish businesses before the Second World War. 
Kosher food shops, sales clerks, clothes markets, cleaning shops and diamond 
industries were scattered throughout the city.11 Of the 70,000 Jews who lived in 
Amsterdam in the first decades of the twentieth century, 49,823 were employed.12 
Those who did not work were mostly homemakers or children who were not 
																																								 																				
9 Joodse Monumenten, ‘Thema Artikelen’ <https://www.joodsmonument.nl/nl/page/548827/thema-artikelen> 
Thema artikelen (Consulted on 23 February 2017). 
10 Joodse Huizen, ‘Open Joodse Huizen’ <http://www.joodsehuizen.nl/het-ontstaan/> Open Joodse Huizen 
(Consulted on 15 February 2017). 
11 P. Tammes, ‘Hack, Pack, Sack: Occupational Structure, Status and Mobility of Jews in Amsterdam, 1851-1941’, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 43:1 (2012) 1-26. 
12 M. Croes and P. Tammes, “Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan”: Een onderzoek naar de overlevingskansen van joden in de 
Nederlandse gemeenten, 1940–1945 (Amsterdam 2006). 
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involved in the labor market.13 By adding the story of entrepreneurs to the online 
platform of Jewish houses, I hope to establish a more complete picture of the 
difficulties the Jewish communities faced during as well as before and after the war, 
specifically in regards to business-related matters. 
A second critique is that because websites do not make use of the possibility to 
‘amend and add content in subsequent periods of memorialization’.14 In other words, 
while physical monuments focus on one specific period or one group, online 
platforms give us the possibility to add and commemorate extended and continuous 
periods. For example, a gravestone is a physical commemorative object that honors 
someone who died on a specific date. Contrastingly, online platforms enable digital 
researchers to add the life story of the person and the reason of death in a simple 
overview. On the new website of Jewish houses, I will attempt to add a new 
dimension of time to the subject of Jewish houses. In contrast to the current situation, 
where the war period is the primary point of attention of the website, I will focus on 
the post-war era and the question of restitution. The purpose of doing so is to 
demonstrate that, for Amsterdam’s Jewish population, the perils of war did not end 
in 1945. 
 My thesis 
Although there are many components to address regarding post war Jewish 
entrepreneurship in Amsterdam, I will focus primarily on the process of restitution 
for Jewish shop owners whose properties were confiscated during the war. The 
process of restitution is one of the few components that is well documented after the 
war, therefore making it a suitable research project. For this thesis, I will investigate 
the process of restitution by discussing six Jewish companies in Amsterdam. I chose 
the companies based on the following criteria: the businesses needed to have Jewish 
ownership before the war, they needed to have been confiscated by Nazi 
																																								 																				
13 Croes and Tammes, “Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan”, 455-456. 
14 Veale, ‘FCJ-014: Online Memorisation’, The Fibreculture Journal, 8. 
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collaborators and, after the war, somebody needed to claim restitution for their 
businesses. Finally, the information about the size of the store had to be available.  In 
the section ‘Material and Method’, I elaborate further on the six case studies.  
 Restitution can be used in various contexts; therefore, I will explain restitution 
as Veraart defines it in his book: Disenfranchisement and Restitution. He states that the 
process of restitution occurs when ‘goods are restituted to the person who lost their 
possessions because of discriminatory measures.’ 15  Additionally he states that 
restitution can be in the form of goods or compensation in liquid assets. 
 My thesis consists of two components. The first component provides a 
narrative description of the Jewish entrepreneurs during and after the war period. I 
focus on the following questions: 
1) how successful were Jewish entrepreneurs from Amsterdam on the eve of 
the Second World War? 
2) what happened to Jewish businesses during and after the Second World 
War? 
The answers to the questions and the narrative form of this part of my thesis will be 
used for the website. The second component will be less relevant for the website of 
Jewish houses, but is academically relevant and has societal relevance. After 
researching and comparing the course of events and outcomes of every case study, I 
have found a set of factors, which explain why every individual restitution 
application had a different outcome. For my thesis, I have researched small, medium 
and large sized businesses. Researching companies of different sizes enabled me to 
test my working hypothesis that for large sized businesses, with a large market value 
prior to the war, the process of restitution was more swift than for medium and 
smaller sized businesses since the Dutch government viewed bigger companies as 
																																								 																				
15 Veraart, Ontrechting en rechtsherstel in Nederland en Frankrijk in de jaren van de bezetting en wederopbouw (Deventer 
2005) 10. 
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more useful than smaller ones because those could – arguably – be more valuable for 
rebuilding the post-war economy. This leads to my main question: given their 
disrupted business during the war, was there a difference in compensation and 
restitution from the Dutch government between small, medium and bigger 
businesses? In this respect did the Commission of Restitution make any clear 
distinction when evaluating applications for restoration?  
Valorization 
The findings from my case study and their subsequent placement on the online 
platform has clear societal relevance. I will reveal and publish an unjustly forgotten 
component of post-war restitution and compensation on the digital platform, so this 
part of history can never be overlooked again and receive the attention it deserves. 
While the existing online websites fall short, in the sense that they do not provide 
information about the post-war period, my research offers a remedy for this 
deficiency.16  First, shedding light and allocating space to the period of restitution on 
online websites will make people aware of the fact that for Dutch Jewish society, the 
war did not end after the liberation. Secondly, it is important to preserve the memory 
of what occurred by educating future generations about how Dutch Jewish survivors 
were treated when trying to recover their possessions. Additionally, it is crucial to 
elaborate upon how Dutch society solved various consequential damages of the war. 
The formal and bureaucratic way the Dutch government tried to manage (and 
circumvent) sensitive issues led to bitter indignation among the vanishing Jewish 
population.  
Thirdly, my thesis shows that it is unwise to simply view the commemoration 
of Jewish history as an entity, as existing online platforms have done. I will 
																																								 																				
16 The digital Jewish monument describes the story of the Jewish individual in the war. While the site is mostly 
launched to remember the victims, it would be a great addition to tell more about the period of compensation 
and restitution after the war. As a consequence, it becomes clear which victims and descendants never had any 
form of compensation. For more information about the website: https://www.joodsmonument.nl/ 
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demonstrate that every Jew’s experience was unique and should receive proper, and 
this means individual, recognition.  
As today’s historians have access to the technology for creating online 
memorials, it is crucial that we take the opportunity to memorialize each 
independent Jewish experience where possible. 
 
1.2 Historiography  
 
 There are currently numerous books about restitution after the Second World 
War. 17  However, research about the topic of Jewish property started relatively 
recently. Research on post war restitution only began properly after 1995, when 
financial regulators, politicians, and lawyers were involved in fierce debates during 
the World Jewish Congress. These debates led to renewed restitution negotiations 
and to new articles that investigated the post-war restitution negotiations. However, 
the new process of restitution received so much publicity that it led to the creation of 
a new myth that the main restitution negotiations were those of recent years.18 Yet, 
the highly publicized renewed negotiations still total no more than about 5% of what 
had been obtained in the first post-war round that continued until the mid-1950s.19 
That is why research on the first round of restitution remains valuable.  
 There are multiple reasons that explain the lack of media attention and scarce 
historical research during and after the first round of restitution. Firstly, Dutch 
bankers, insurance companies and stockbrokers benefited from the stolen Jewish 
																																								 																				
17 We must take into account that I only talk about restitution and compensation for stolen goods in this 
paragraph. Wiedergutmachung and compensation for killed descendants and other forms of restitution will be 
disregarded here. 
18 R. Zweig, ’Restitution: Why did It Take 50 Years or did It?’, in: M. Gerstenfeld, Europe’s Crumbling Myths: The 
Post-Holocaust Origins of Today’s Anti-Semitism (Jerusalem, 2003) 11.  
19 Ibid.	
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assets after the Second World War. In other words, companies who profited from 
Jewish assets avoided discussing the restitution of Jewish property because they 
profited from their ownership of these businesses or properties. They argued that 
restitution of these assets could lead to an economic downfall for the Netherlands.20  
Secondly, war victims did not talk about their experiences or when they did, 
no one listened.21 It took Holocaust survivors fifty years before they could openly 
talk about their past and reach a receptive audience. A reason for this silence was a 
lack of understanding between Jews and non-Jews and the fact that non-Jews did not 
want to hear Holocaust survivors’ stories.22  These are a few reasons why all the 
literature that addresses the first and second period of restitution appeared after 
1995. I will discuss these when I analyze the international literature during the 
period 1950-1995.  
In the up following paragraphs, I will distinguish applicable literature on the 
topic of restitution into three different sections. The first two sections discuss the 
literature about the restitution process on a macro level. This literature focuses on the 
1) international restitution process and 2) the Dutch restitution process. In the third 
section, I describe the literature that addresses the process of restitution on a micro 
level. In other words, I will set forth the literature that examines restitution that took 
place in cities and villages.  
 The following analysis of international and national historiography does not 
claim to be neither complete nor conclusive, but rather aims to provide a general 
overview. 
																																								 																				
20			E. Bouw, Rechtspraak in tijden van crisis: Over bedreiging en kansen voor rechtspraak, economie en 
rechtstaat (Amsterdam 2011) 8. 
21 ‘Het grote zwijgen’, Trouw, 17-01-2009. 
22 ‘Sala’s gift: My Mother’s Holocaust Story’, The New York Times, 12-11-2006. 
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International restitution: from 1945 to 1995 (Macro level) 
 
In this section, I will give some comparisons and differences in the restitution process 
of the following countries: Germany, Austria, Italy, France and Belgium. I picked 
these countries for two reasons. First, the situation in these countries was relatively 
similar to that in the Netherlands, in contrast to what occurred in communist Eastern 
European regimes after the war.23 Secondly, all these countries developed during the 
after-war period into democracies. 24  Therefore, the policies of the after-war 
governments and the processes of restitution are easier to compare with each other. 
	
1) International Restitution, 1945-1960 	
 There was no research published in any of the five countries during the 1950s. 
That does not mean that there was no restitution process. It was in Germany where 
compensation took place most prominently for stolen assets of Jews during the 
Second World War. The results of studies after 1995 show that Germany paid three 
billion USD to Israel.25  Israel was in an economic crisis and needed the money 
according to Zweig and therefore accepted a figure considerably lower than the 6 
billion that Israel estimated was due.26 The problem is that there was no research 
done on how the three billion was divided between  the victims of the Holocaust. 
This problem appears also in studies carried out on Austria and France. For example, 
Paul Obberhammer studies the restitution process in Austria after the Second World 
War. He only mentions the total amount of restitution for Jewish survivors per asset 
																																								 																				
23 W. Plumpe and André Steiner, ‘Dimensionen wirtschaftlicher Integrationsprozesse in West- und Osteuropa 
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Economic History Yearbook, 49.2 (2016) 21-38. 
24 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at at standstill’, The Economist 5 (2013) 1-
45. 
25 R. W. Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World: A History of the Claims Conference (London 2001). 
26 ‘Ben-Gurion’s word’, Ynetnews, 11-12-2007. 
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type in Austria.27 Thus, the difference between what Jews received from restitution 
ranges from 50 to 225 Austrian Schillings. 28  There is no mention of individual 
payouts to survivors per category of stolen possessions.  
 Most of the international literature investigates the factors that led to the lack 
of restitution in the 1950s. In the next paragraph, I will summarize the main results of 
this work.   
 
1) The lack of restitution was caused by prevalent anti-Semitism in West European 
society. Jews were still seen as inferior after the Second World War. Therefore, 
restitution was not seen as being necessary. 29  2) Non-Jewish inhabitants and 
governments claimed that everybody suffered during the war at the hands of the 
Nazis. Jews were not in a position to complain. If Jews had something to restitute, 
they could submit restitution and reparations claims to the West German 
government instead.30 3) Post war rules governing restitution were inadequate and 
incomplete. Legislation was not drawn up for individual cases of restitution. The 
consequence was that governments acted in a bureaucratic and inflexible way.31 In 
my thesis, I will use the historiography to compare whether these factors played a 
role in the slow pace of restitution in the Netherlands. I take into account that most of 
the international literature is focusing on the restitution process of the 1950s. As I 
mentioned before, the literature applies the research of restitution to the complete 
																																								 																				
27 P. Obberhammer, ‘Restitution of Jewish Property in Austria’, Marx-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht (2000) 731-769. 
28 Ibid., 755-756. 
29 G. Tulea and E. Krausz, Starting the Twenty-First Century: Sociological Reflections & Challenge (Somerset 
2002) 212; V. vanden Daelen, Laten we hun lied verder zingen. De heropbouw van de joodse gemeenschap in 
Antwerpen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog (1944-1960) (Amsterdam 2008) 45. 
30 L. Auslander, ‘Coming Home’, Centre for Judaic Studies, 25; G. Tulea and E. Krausz, Starting the Twenty-First 
Century: Sociological Reflections & Challenge (Somerset 2002) 202. 
31 Tulea and Krausz, Starting the Twenty-First Century, 212; E. Rosand, ‘Confronting the Nazi Past at the End at 
the 20th Century: The Austrian Model’, Berkeley Journal of International Law 20 (2001) 202-211. 
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Jewish community. However, presumably, the amount of restitution was not 
distributed evenly across the Jewish population as some prominent families received 
more than others. Therefore, it is more relevant to investigate documented individual 
restitution cases, as I do by examining the restitution process involving six different 
Jewish companies based in Amsterdam. This proves the value of my research once 
again.  
 
2) International restitution between 1960 and 1995   
 After the war, Jews did not talk about their experience because of a lack of 
understanding in society. Societies and individuals wanted to forget the tragedies of 
the past.32 A shift occurred when Adolf Eichmann was put on trial in 1961 in Israel. 
That a Nazi was convicted meant for Jewish survivors that they could recognize 
themselves as victims. During the trial, personal testimonies of Jews were read on a 
stage. Jews saw themselves as the bearers of history. 33  However, despite the 
recognition that survivor testimony gained during the Eichmann trial, public interest 
in survivors’ experience in West Europe remained low.34 In subsequent decades, 
public interest grew because of the release of movies such as The Pawnbroker, The 
Garden of the Finzi-Continis and	the miniseries Holocaust.35 The fact that Jews could talk 
more openly about the Holocaust and the raise of interest by non-Jews made it easier 
to start a debate about restitution and compensation.  
 
3) International restitution after 1995  
 Scholars only started paying attention to post war restitution after 1995. It was 
																																								 																				
32 J. Wiedenhorn, ‘Case study: ‘’Above All, We Need The Witness’’: The Oral History of Holocaust Survivors’, in: 
A. D. Ritchie, The Oxford Handbook of Oral History (Oxford, 2012) 245-254.	
33 Ibid., 247. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 247-248.	
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a reaction to the debates between financial regulators, politicians, and lawyers 
during the World Jewish Congress. These debates led to renewed restitution 
negotiations and to new scholarship that investigated post-war restitution. However, 
as I mentioned earlier, the new process of restitution received so much publicity that 
it led to a creation of a new myth that the main restitution negotiations were those of 
recent years.  In my opinion, international research that tries to explain the lack of 
restitution before 1995 and the total amount of restitution provided overlooks the 
human dimension by ignoring personal stories of postwar restitution. That is why 
my research will add a new perspective by studying the individual process of 
restitution from 1945 to the mid-1950s.   
 
Historiography about the restitution process in the Netherlands  
 
Most of the national literature focuses on the role the Dutch government played in 
the first restitution process. As earlier mentioned, the debate began after 1995 when a 
hypothesis was made that the post-war Dutch government made many mistakes 
during the first restitution process from 1945 to the mid-1950s. Historians and other 
social researchers realized their opportunity to investigate how the Dutch 
government responded to restitution demands. Additionally, they wanted to 
examine what underlying factors caused the government to make decisions that 
were not necessarily ethical. I can use this literature for some important aspects of 
this study. Examining the literature about the role of the government will advance 
my understanding of the responses, decisions and actions of the Dutch government 
in the case of Jewish restitution requests. However, my research also differs from 
others in several important aspects. I will focus on Jews rather than the state as the 
main actor while investigating the restitution process. In contrast to most studies, the 
research presented here focuses on a specific geographical location, namely 
Amsterdam. Presumably, the restitution process differed in various locations, and 
therefore my research will help to be geographically specific. The advantage of 
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concentrating on Amsterdam is that it was the major cultural and economic center of 
the Netherlands, especially for Dutch Jews, and therefore there was greater 
government involvement. The documentation of this involvement supports a more 
profound conclusion about the greater government decision-making process 
regarding restitution. Unlike how I discussed the international literature, I will now 
dissect the Dutch literature into finer parts. By doing so, I will distinguish the Dutch 
literature per actor. The first part of the historiographical debate focuses on the 
government and society. 
  After the beginning of the second restitution attempt – in 1997 in the Dutch 
case – and the consequent media attention, the Dutch government established 
national and private commissions to research what happened to the properties of 
Jews who perished during the Second World War under the Scholten Commission.36 
Wouter Jan Veraart led this commission. He based his conclusion from the point of 
view of legal philosophy. He stated that the government tried to expedite the 
restitution process in the most efficient way. 37  According to the post-war 
government, restitution was not necessary when there was no claimant. Later, more 
commissions were established. For example, a supervisory commission researched 
financial institutions during the Second World War in the Netherlands (1998). A 
second committee named the Bondig Committee wrote a special dossier in 
collaboration with the Central Jewish Organization about the restitution of insurance 
funds (1999) and confiscated stocks (1999).38 
																																								 																				
36 W. Veraart, Ontrechting en rechtsherstel in Nederland en Frankrijk in de jaren van de bezetting en wederopbouw 
(Deventer 2005) 195. 
37 Eindrapport van de begeleidingscommissie onderzoek financiële tegoeden WO-II in Nederland Commissie Scholten 
(Leiden 1999). Link: Supervisory Report 
38 Eindrapport van de Commissie van Onderzoek LIRO-archieven en archievengids Projectgroep tegoeden WOII (Den 
Haag 1998); Eindrapport van de begeleidingscommissie onderzoek financiële tegoeden WO-II in Nederland Commissie 
Scholten (Leiden 1999); Laatste rapport van de contactgroep over de fondsen WOII Commissie van Kemenade, de 
Contactgroep (1999). 
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  The results from the research conducted by the government and private 
organizations inspired researchers to study the first restitution process. Individuals 
such as Regina Grüter started writing critical articles about the role of the post-war 
government.39 She obtained background information from earlier research by the 
government and private organizations. Grüter was one of the researchers who 
participated in the commission that researched financial institutions such as 
insurance companies. She found so many injustices as a commission member that 
she decided that she wanted to carry out her own research on the topic. 
 Grüter wrote first about government mistakes in the case of restitution for the 
stolen money from Jewish life insurance policies during the war. Secondly, she 
investigated what happened to the money that was in possession of the bank 
Lippmann Rosenthal & Co. (later Liro). Liro earned during the war 26 million Dutch 
guilders from Jewish policies. Throughout the war, the bank claimed the money and 
therefore received payouts from murdered Jews’ accounts. After the war, the Dutch 
Board of Restitution (s chapter 1 for more information) ordered the insurance 
companies, including Liro, to pay Jews redemption payments. However, nobody 
solved two problems. First, the insurance companies already paid a huge amount of 
money to Lippmann Rosenthal & Co. as payouts for life insurance. The problem was 
that nobody knew how much money was paid. Secondly, many Jews died during the 
war, so there was a lot of unclaimed money that the bank possessed and a lot of 
Jewish art on the wall of museums that went unreturned.  
  Manfred Gerstenfeld also considered how the government oversaw the 
restitution process. She investigated the factors that explain why the second 
restitution process started after 1997. 40  It appears that the government of the 
Netherlands did not intend to repay all the money that was withheld illegally and 
																																								 																				
39 See, for example, R. Grüter, ‘De roof van Joodse oorlogspolissen in historisch perspectief’, Het Verzekerings-
Archief 78:1 (2001) 24-32. 
40 M. Gerstenfeld, Judging The Netherlands: The Renewed Holocaust Restitution Process, 1997-2000 (Jerusalem 2011). 
	18	
immorally from the Jews. Without any pressure from society directly after the 
Second World War, ‘The government made it possible to prevent significant 
international exposure of the maltreatment of many surviving Dutch Jews by the 
postwar authorities’.41 After fierce debates began in 1995 over the restitution process, 
the Dutch government was afraid of new media attention. Therefore, a renewed 
restitution process was initiated in 1997. 
 Martin Dean focused on the government’s actions in the restitution process. 
He concluded that the delaying of Jewish restitution on immovable property 
occurred for two reasons. First, the government did not know who possessed the 
Jewish assets. Jewish assets were spread between many individuals. Sometimes these 
individuals sold the assets to another person. Therefore, it was not clear who was in 
possession of the assets and so the government was not able to find them and return 
the possessions to their formal Jewish owner.42  
 Elly Touwen-Bouwsma also focused on the government in her work.43 She 
underlined the mistake made by the Dutch government by delegating the decision-
making about restitution to an external commission, the Commission of Restitution, 
in 1945. This delegation created various administrative problems. The commission 
was not clear about who was eligible to attain restitution and who was not. Without 
any guidelines, it was impossible to filter the actual victims from the frauds. 
Therefore, in some cases Jews who were the actual victims did not get any 
restitution, while others who were not eligible, did receive restitution.44   
  
 
																																								 																				
41 Gerstenfeld, Judging The Netherlands, 183. 
42 Dean, M., C. Goschler and P. Ther, Robbery and Restitution: The Conflict over Jewish Property in Europe (New York 
2007) 60-65.	
43 E. Touwen-Bouwsma, Op zoek naar grenzen. Toepassing en uitvoering van de wetten voor oorlogsslachtoffers 
(Amsterdam 2010). 
44 Ibid., 329-336. 
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Local Dutch historiography of restitution  
 
Investigations on a micro level are more relevant to my research approach, 
specifically the research that investigates restitution processes within a city and on an 
individual basis. First, large corporations that discovered in the mid-1990s that they 
possessed confiscated Jewish money during the Second World War started their own 
investigations. These large corporations investigated their role in the restitution 
process directly after the Second World War. I will use this literature because it will 
give me more insight about individual restitution cases.  
 ABN-AMRO is a Dutch bank with headquarters in Amsterdam. This bank 
started researching its role during the Second World War and more importantly, 
after the war. In 2005, they gave Milja van Tielhof all the resources necessary for her 
to investigate the role of all the bank’s affiliates during restitution. Her conclusion is 
clear. She states that well-known Jews or those who had acquaintances during that 
time who worked at ABN-AMRO Bank had far more chance of receiving restitution 
than others who did not. 45 Apparently, institutions’ preferred treatment of former 
employees also applied to other actors that were involved in the restitution process. 
My research will show whether Jews associated with companies that were more 
influential received suitable restitution sooner than Jews from less influential and 
smaller companies.  
 Finally, I want to discuss research that investigated the restitution process 
using regions and cities as case studies. I will only discuss the literature that 
discusses the process in Amsterdam. This will give me an insight into the municipal 
Jewish community’s decisions and attitudes of restitution. 
																																								 																				
45 M. van Tielhof, Banken in bezettingstijd. De voorgangers van ABN-AMRO tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog en de 
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 Eric Slot, writing for the magazine Historisch Nieuwbslad,46  focused on the 
furtive Jewish houses in Amsterdam. He states that it was not the German 
government who became rich from these properties, but individual Amsterdam 
residents. They profited because they bought Jewish houses after their owners were 
deported. After the war, the properties passed through many hands in a short 
period. Therefore, it was hard for Jews to prove if the most recent owners bought the 
properties ‘in good faith.’ The accuser always had to prove their property was not 
rightfully the possession of the most recent owners before it was returned. Many 
people who profited from these houses told the judge from the Commission of 
Restitution that they did not know that these houses were previously Jewish 
properties. It is easy to imagine that it is almost impossible for Jews to dispute such 
claims without any tangible proof. However, the confiscator of a company had to 
sign a German oath to eliminate any Jewish employees working in the business.47 
These German oaths were proof of their bad intentions.  
  Serge ter Braake and Maarten-Jan Vos also investigated post-war restitution in 
Amsterdam.48 They focus on the restitution of houses. They also broadened their 
research in order to investigate all the Jewish immovable valuables taken during the 
Second World War. These Jewish immovable valuables included real estate, 
farmland and shop buildings.  
This investigation looks similar to mine, but there are key differences. Their 
book describes the government’s tangled administrative process of restitution. They 
try to answer whether there were different policies for different Jewish possessions. 
Therefore, while the subject is the same, they focus on the actual administrative 
processes while I focus on Jews as the main actors in the restitution process.  
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 To summarize, after the beginning of the international debate about Jewish 
restitution of stolen assets that began in 1995, academic research on restitution also 
started. The international and Dutch literature can be distinguished according to 
which actors they focused upon. First, some research projects concentrated on the 
role of the government, private organizations and Dutch society in the case of the 
restitution process. They try to explain how policy and attitudes enabled the 
restitution process. A second type uses Jews as the main actors. However, these 
studies do not look at individual cases, but assume that every restitution process was 
the same. In my opinion, this is inadequate, because the Commission of Restitution 
dealt with every case individually. 
In my research, I want to investigate these individual cases in the form of 
businesses in Amsterdam that demanded some form of restitution. Additionally, I 
will investigate if the Commission of Restitution made any difference in the amount 
of restitution for each store. Subjectivity and economic necessity could have favored 
important and popular businesses. I will show that every process is different and 
that problems appear in the different restitution procedures. Secondly, most of the 
existing research adopts a national or international perspective. My research 
investigates the restitution process from a city standpoint, making it more in-depth 
and personal as a result. Finally, my thesis examines six cases involving Jewish 
businesses that resulted in some sort of success in attaining restitution. I will show 
how Jews experienced the restitution process in Amsterdam after the war and 
determine what factors led to their eventual receipt of compensation.  
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1.3 Theory 
They will all go out of business, everything is already arranged, de Bijenkorf, Gerzon, Hema, 
these buildings will be beautiful circuit houses while we will destroy the rest of the Jewish 
buildings.49  
Around 1880, many Jews started to benefit from economic growth in Amsterdam. 
They saw new marketing opportunities to sell their varied traditional products. 
Therefore, new retail businesses, where one could buy different products, opened in 
Amsterdam. For example, Bijenkorf, Hema, Maison de Bonneterie, Metz & Co, were 
established around this time. In fact, they are companies that are still in business 
today.50 These businesses welcomed all customers. They grew quickly and could 
compete with non-Jewish owned enterprise. All of this success was due to a Jewish 
assimilation process that began in the nineteenth century.51  
Jews became part of socialist political parties and became members of labor 
unions as their assimilation progressed. One example of a labor organization that 
Jews joined is the General Diamond Workers Union. Jews also started to live 
throughout the city instead of remaining in a single Jewish neighborhood. However, 
Jews continuously remained close to their community both socially and religiously. 
Despite their involvement in economic life, Dutch Jews experienced continuing anti-
Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century.52  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, criticism grew of the success of 
Jewish owned retail businesses. As a result, such businesses became the focus for 
anti-Semitism. For example, in a critical article that appeared in a newsletter from 
1910, the Bijenkorf was viewed as a store bought by Jewish capital.53 Despite growing 
																																								 																				
49 Pogrom-illusies van een N.S.B.-er’, Het Volksdagblad: Dagblad voor Nederland, 28-01-1939. 
50 J. Stoutenbeek and P. Vigeveno, Gids van Joods erfgoed in Nederland (n.p. 2016) 40. 
51 J. Stoutenbeek and P. Vigeveno, Joods Amsterdam: een cultuurhistorische gids (Amsterdam 1997). 
52 Ibid., 15-16. 
53 ‘Kerstgedachten’, De Tribune, 23-12-1916. 
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anti-Semitism, Jews were still able to continue in business until the late 1930s. Within 
the social structure of the well-developed Jewish community, owners of the retail 
businesses and other wealthy people joined the Jewish elite. People who worked in 
intellectual professions, such as civil servants, diamond dealers, textile workers or 
tobacconists stood in the middle. At the bottom of the ladder stood hawkers, market 
traders and individual retailers.54 
 For my dissertation, it is impossible to categorize different Jewish professions 
for the simple reason that Jews worked in a variety of industries. This is why I will 
categorize the Jewish businesses by size in Amsterdam. In my research question, I 
differentiate between micro (smaller than 10 workers), small (between 10 and 50 
workers) and medium- sized businesses (between 50 and 250 employees). In 
medium-sized businesses, there was a Jewish director.55 As previously mentioned, I 
want to consider whether the size of the store made any difference for restitution 
after the Second World War. For example, did a medium-sized retail store gain 
restitution more easily than a micro store? 
To specify my research, I will only investigate the first period of restitution 
and compensation in Amsterdam, which occurred from the mid-1950s.  
 There are several theories that could explain if and why there was a difference 
in the amount of restitution granted. The difference could be triggered by:   
1) Re-building the Dutch economy;  
2) Pressure from large companies and networks;  
3) Agreements during the war;  
4) Chance of survival of Jewish owners;  
																																								 																				
54 Stoutenbeek and Vigeveno, Gids van Joods erfgoed, 40-41. 
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 5) Other factors, such as whether survivors stayed in the Netherlands.  
 
1) First, there was a shortage of housing in post-war Netherlands because of 
German bombing. Second, there was not enough food for the Dutch 
population following the war. Third, the population wanted to eliminate any 
support or collaboration with the Nazi cause. Dutch society felt that political 
collaborators such as NSB’ers, the Dutch Fascist Political Party, and Nazis 
deserved punishment. Fourth, the Dutch government wanted to solve the 
problem of unemployment and had to create more jobs for the population.56 
Therefore, the Dutch government’s primary focus was not Jewish restitution 
after the Second World War.57 However, a Jewish business’ restitution might 
have had a higher priority if it could have contributed to the reconstruction of 
the Netherlands. For example, a thriving business before the war could 
contribute to the post-war economy and could provide more employment. 
Another example is a successful butcher before the war, which could 
contribute to the post-war food supply. To summarize, it is possible that the 
government gave priority to the restitution of those Jewish businesses that 
could contribute to the post-war economy.  
2) The difference in size of the company could contribute to the fact that war 
restitution was not equal for medium and small sized Jewish companies. 
Alternatively, as the economist Bauw states: ‘it is not clear that judicial 
independency can exist in a country during an economic crisis’.58 However, 
the economy is dependent on jurisdiction at times of economic crises. 
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57 Veraart, Ontrechting, 17. 
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Therefore, extensive lawsuits worked against economic growth, while a quick 
solution could help the economy grow. As a result, they acquired restitution 
and compensation as quickly as possible, while smaller companies had to wait 
for their turn for such settlement disputes to end.   
To summarize, because of the Dutch government’s desire to rebuild the 
economy after the war, the negotiated settlements of restitution for larger 
companies took precedence because they could contribute faster to economic 
improvement. As a result, these bigger companies also could demand higher 
restitution and compensation amounts in the courts because both sides 
benefited from each other. 
3) Some Jewish directors of profitable large companies before the war made 
contracts with non-Jews so they could run the company until peace returned. 
It was easier for wealthy Jewish directors to keep a contractual distance from 
their companies, as they were not financially dependent on their business. For 
example, one of the biggest department businesses in the Netherlands, the 
Bijenkorf, changed their Board of Directors completely in 1940 to prove to the 
Nazis that it was not a Jewish company.59 Despite this contract, the former 
Jewish board could give advice from exile in England. After the war, 
companies who did the same as the Bijenkorf did not have to prove to the 
Commission of Restitution that they were the true owners of their companies. 
This is because it was contractually agreed before or during the war. 
4) The chance of survival during the war was also higher for directors of large 
companies. First, they had more connections with people who could help 
them hide or flee abroad because of their wide-ranging business contacts. 
Secondly, they had access to more money, making it easier to survive without 
their business. De Blij stated in his case study of Delft, for example, that only 
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people with money had a chance of escaping the clutches of the Germans.60 
Therefore, it is possible that mostly bigger companies were able to claim 
restitution after the Second World War; they had a higher chance of surviving 
and possessing documentation unlike the owners of smaller companies who 
were likely to have been killed. In the case of small business owners, 
restitution only started when their families reclaimed their businesses. For 
them, the process would take longer because it would be delayed and because 
they often did not have proof of ownership as it was destroyed or lost during 
the war. 
5) Other factors that could explain the difference of restitution between micro, 
small and medium businesses are:  
o The amount of restitution: it is possible that the government prioritized 
higher requests of restitution by people who were wealthier. 
Presumably, wealthy people were seen as being more prominent and 
could expect more favor and help from the government. 
o The psychological factor: micro and small enterprises may have 
believed that they had less of a chance to receive compensation.61 By 
considering this, it is possible that the owners of micro and small 
businesses did not claim their losses and therefore received no 
compensation.  
o Emigration from the Netherlands: survivors may have preferred to 
move overseas – for example, to Israel or the United States – rather than 
return to a country whose Jewish community had been decimated 
during the Holocaust.  
  
																																								 																				
60 J.W. de Blij, Oorlog en verzet in de Prinsenstad 1940-1945: Een overzicht van de gebeurtenissen in Delft in en rond de 
bezettingstijd (Delft 2005). 
61 V. Raman, ‘A self-fulfilling prophecy: Linking belief to behavior’, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
1234 (2011) 104-107. 
	27	
1.4 Material and method 
My research is mostly qualitative. In this paragraph, I will describe how I collected 
my data to discuss post war compensation for Jewish micro, small and medium-
sized businesses. My goal is not to provide detailed lists of these enterprises because 
it is impossible to investigate all of the Jewish businesses in Amsterdam before the 
war. As earlier mentioned, I identified a sample of enterprises based on the following 
criteria: the businesses needed to have a Jewish owner before the war, they needed to 
have been confiscated by a Nazi collaborator and finally, after the war, somebody 
needed to claim compensation for the businesses. An advantage to this method is 
that it is as objective as possible. However, the disadvantage of this method is that 
many archives about restitution were destroyed because archivists did not think 
these records were relevant.62 Because of this documentation, I went to the archive 
and investigated carefully the records that still exist and that met my selection 
criteria. Afterwards, I categorized the few enterprises that did conform to my 
selection criteria into groups based on the number of their employees. I used the 
number of employees to define their size. The businesses that I finally chose were 
- Gerzon (considered a medium store) 
- Metz & Co (medium store) 
- Vleeschpaleis David van der Stam (considered a small store) 
- Firma Alex Citroen (small store) 
- Firma M. Walg&Zn. (considered a micro store) 
- Firma H.L. Granaat (micro store) 
My research cannot obviously completely represent all the Jewish businesses in 
Amsterdam in each size category. This is because there is an absence of available 
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datasets for the timeframe of interest. It is also not possible to ascertain background 
information of all the mentioned persons in these records. Some information about 
the origin of the confiscators during the war is not accessible. My research into 
national archives, newspapers, archives of the Liro Bank and birth records did not 
always produce relevant information. 
However, my aim is not to carry out a representative study and provide a 
complete story. Instead, I strive to provide an extensive analysis using the material I 
found to answer my research questions. The primary question I address with my 
research is: Given their disrupted business during the war, was there a difference in 
compensation and restitution from the Dutch government between small, medium 
and bigger store? That is why I investigated the same Jewish businesses before (1930 
to 1940), during (1940-1945), and after the war (1945-1960). Additional, I used 
different sources to include all the actors (the Jewish business owners, the 
confiscators during the war, Dutch newspapers and the Dutch government) who 
were involved in the restitution process. The sources that I use are 1) newspapers 2) 
jurisprudence 3) letters to the Commission of Restitution and 4) personal archives of 
the individuals involved.  
 
Newspapers 
I will investigate how newspapers wrote about the post-war governmental 
compensation for Jewish businesses that were confiscated or sold in the Second 
World War. During the war, the Nazi-approved government took control of the 
Dutch media in its attempt to indoctrinate the Netherlands’ population. Therefore, in 
the media available in the Netherlands during the Second World War, the legitimacy 
of the sales and confiscation process is hard to determine because of the difficulty 
distinguishing facts from indoctrination. 63  Because of this, I concentrate on 
newspaper media after the Second World War.   
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 After the liberation of the Netherlands on 5 May 1945, by primarily Canadian 
armed forces, the media became independent from governmental influence again. To 
begin, I will use newspapers to investigate if the print news media tried to intervene 
during the compensation process. It is possible that the media tried to persuade their 
readers and the federal Dutch government to compensate the Jews.64 Secondly, the 
media can be used as an outlet for Jewish entrepreneurs. It is possible that Jewish 
entrepreneurs tried to tell their stories and put pressure on the government via 
newspapers.  
 In my research, I use the digitalized newspapers that can be found on the 
online website Delpher.65 This website was developed by the Royal Library, which 
digitized 1.3 million newspaper articles. However, many remaining newspapers are 
not digitally accessible. This lack of digitalized material is a disadvantage because 
without digitalization, the newspapers are more difficult to access. Despite this 
difficulty, my research is as extensive as possible. 
Jurisprudence 
It is important to study the jurisprudence written by the judicial powers regarding 
the restitution of Jewish properties. It elucidates the rights of the claimant. The 
jurisprudence in a summary proceeding was invoked when the statement of the 
Commission of Restitution was not clear. These legal records can be found in the 
National Archive.66 In the archive, there is a separate section that focuses only on 
Amsterdam. This section consists of around one thousand records that relate to all 
jurisprudence for the compensation of Jewish real estate. 
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Letters to the Commission of Restitution 
The idea was that returning Jews and the new owner would first try to agree on 
solutions together. Often, the Jewish families and the new owner came to a 
compromise. Many cases ended shortly afterwards, whereby the Jewish family got 
their property back, or was paid an amount of money equal to the value of the 
property. When both parties did not come to an agreement, they could go to the 
Commission of Restitution. This governmental institution was meant to give an 
objective decision. Because the statements of the Commission were extensive, I also 
use this archive to describe the process of restitution for Vleeschpaleis van der Stam 
and Firma N. Walg. All the letters to the Commission of Restitution can be found in 
the National Archive and in personal archives donated to the city of Amsterdam.67 
 
 Personal archives 
The companies Gerzon, Metz & Co and Firma Alex Citroen 68  transferred their 
personal archives to the city of Amsterdam. The families collected these archives, 
which cover a long period of history. There are more than one thousand archived 
records available, from 1750 to the present. I have selected specific records for the 
period between 1935 and 1960. I must consider the fact that some relevant records 
were absent from the files because a family did not see it as necessary to add them. 
Some reasons for this could be that they felt the documents contained adverse 
information or because they were simply lost over the course of time. It is also 
																																								 																				
67 Nationaal Archief Den Haag (further NA), Raad voor het Rechtsherstel: Afdeling Rechtspraak, 1945-1971 
(further RRR) inv No. 2.09.48.02, Griffie van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1945-1969 (further 721). 
68 In consecutive order:  
Gerzon: Stadsarchief Amsterdam (further SAA), Modemagazijnen Gebroeders Gerzon N.V (further MGG), inv. 
No. 539; Metz & Co: SAA, Firma Metz en Co. (further MC), inv. No. 977; Firma Alex Citroen: SAA, Karel 
Alexander Citroen en de Firma Alex Citroen (further KCFAC), inv. No. 30651. 
 
 
	31	
possible that firms who received compensation wanted to keep the exact amount of 
money private. 
 However, these archives do contain sufficient information to be good sources 
for my research. First, these archives give insights into the personal feelings of the 
Jewish business operators. Secondly, there are no other alternative archives like those 
from the Verwalter (administrator), available. To summarize, in my thesis I consider 
that the sources declare the opinion of one actor: the Jewish merchants and business 
people. Although the perspectives were relatively limited, a lack of archives cannot 
be a reason to avoid research for an issue as important as restitution. 
 Finally, I found the archive of Firma H.L. Granaat through research on the 
internet. The family name of Granaat appears on the website of Jewish Monuments. 
In one of the reactions under an article, it appeared that the new owners, the van 
Lissum family, has possession of most of the archive of the Granaat family. After 
contacting Jan Sebastian van Lissum, the recent owner of the buildings formerly part 
of Firma Granaat, I received the approval to use the personal archive of the Firma 
Granaat for my Master’s thesis. The archive consists of a box full of pictures and 
correspondence between the brothers Eduard and Louis Granaat. I am thankful that I 
also could see the mails Mr. van Lissum sent to Granaat family members.  
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Chapter 2: Jewish companies on the eve and 
during the Second World War (1930-1944) 
Everywhere Jews are hunting for money, everywhere they deprive their host nations their 
bread and earnings, mess with the prices and incite people against each other.69  
Before 1930, it was impossible to distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish 
companies. The only way to know that a business was Jewish was because of the 
store’s location in Amsterdam’s Jewish neighborhood. The reason that Jewish and 
non-Jewish businesses could not be visibly separated was because of the assimilation 
of the Jewish population. The assimilation process on the labor market started after 
the laws of 1880, which allowed Jews to enter the entire labor market. Under the 1880 
legislation, Jews received the same civil rights as everyone else and were full citizens 
of the Netherlands. 70  Therefore, many Jews became laborers in cigar factories, 
warehouses or famous antique markets. 
The opening of the entire labor market in 1880 also made it possible for Jews 
to enter intellectual professions. 71  Thus, Jews became lawyers, doctors and 
journalists. The growth of the economy after 1870 in the Netherlands provided space 
for Jews to become involved in the financial world as well. Some Jews started to 
become wealthy in this period by successfully directing the operation of factories, 
warehouses, and retail businesses. However, the ability to independently start 
profitable businesses and therefore climb the social ladder was only attainable for a 
small minority of the Jewish population. Most Jews joined the labor market as 
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employees. The biggest industry where Jews worked was in the diamond industry. 
Around 1914, approximately half of the Jewish working population found a job in 
the diamond business.72   
   Jews became more integrated in Dutch economic culture. For example, non-
Jewish Dutch citizens began to interact with Jewish businesses. However, while 
Jewish and Dutch cultures intertwined and relationships between Jews and non-Jews 
grew, Jews never completely culturally assimilated into the greater Amsterdam 
society. Jewish culture and religion remained an important factor of Jewish identity. 
In fact, laborers tried to protect their Jewish culture.73    
 Although Jews were active in the greater Dutch society, the fact that they did 
not completely assimilate sparked criticism from sections of non-Jewish Dutch 
society who condemned Jews for working on Sundays and on Christian holidays.74  
This criticism began to trigger economic anti-Semitism. Jews were seen as 
individuals who profited from Dutch hospitality.75 
 In the 1930s, anti-Semitism grew due to high unemployment and the financial 
crisis of 1929.76 Certain historians claim that the growth of anti-Semitism was the 
result of pre-existing attitudes that peaked during this time.77 Openly anti-Semitic 
statements were made in the Netherlands in the 1930s. Magazines (The Aristo, Volk en 
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Vaderland), political parties (Het Zwarte Front78 and the NSB79), and academics (e.g. 
Professor Kips) spread messages of anti-Semitism.80  After the German invasion of 
the Netherlands on 8 May 1940, life changed for the Jewish population culturally, 
religiously, and economically. Starting in 1940, all Jewish companies had to register 
with the wirschaftprufstelle (audit office). Around 22,000 Jews registered their 
companies. In 1941, the Germans demanded that every large registered Jewish 
company had to be Aryanized, while every small company had to be confiscated.81 
The money paid to Jews for confiscation was a deposit to an account in the 
Lippmann Rosenthal & Co. bank.82 This deposited money was not available for Jews 
to use. Therefore, they could not withdraw the funds and use them to flee the 
Germans.  
 Once Jewish companies were confiscated and Aryanized, they came into the 
possession of a Verwalter (the German word for confiscator). The Verwalter was a 
German appointed custodian or trustee of the Jewish company from the time it was 
Aryanized or confiscated until it was sold to a new non-Jewish owner.   
 The Germans preferred to appoint a Dutch collaborator as Verwalter because 
they felt that employees would work harder for a Dutch boss than for a German 
occupier. However, the Verwalters had to prove that they were authentic national 
socialists because the Germans did not want any rebellion against their policies. For 
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example, the Dutch companies had to send the Germans needed war material and 
machines.83 However, there were not enough trusted Dutch national socialists, so 
Germans were also appointed to Verwalter positions. Although Verwalters were free 
to earn money and conduct business as they pleased, German needs took priority.84  
 Jewish misery did not end with the growth of anti-Semitism and the loss of 
their livelihoods. The Germans then began to register all Jewish persons in the 
Netherlands. The Germans made them walk in public with a yellow star in order 
isolate them from everyone else.85 Additionally, they ordered the Jews in Amsterdam 
to move to a quickly built ghetto, established from the Jodenbreestraat towards the 
Nieuwe Kerkstraat. This made it easier for the Germans to bring Jews to the central 
train station. From the train station, Jews were deported to a durchgangslager (transit 
camp) at Westerbork. From July 1942 to September 1944, Jews were taken to one of 
many death camps.86  
Most of the Jews from Amsterdam did not survive the war. From the 80,000 
Jews living in Amsterdam in 1940, only fifteen thousand Jews survived the German 
atrocities.87 The Jews survivors returned with significant trauma and without any 
possessions. The Jewish victims could not count on a warm welcome. The non-
Jewish Dutch population also suffered, especially during the 1944-45 ‘Hunger 
Winter’, and did not have sympathy for people claiming victimhood.88 Because of 
this disinterest, restitution of property started slowly and in a disorganized manner.89 
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Whether this also applied to the restitution of companies will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.   
 First, I will introduce the businesses in their order of size in the next 
paragraph. I begin by discussing some general information about each selected 
company. Thereafter, I explain what happened to these enterprises during the 
Second World War.   
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Figure A-1. Locations of the confiscated firms investigated in the text. Note that the quantity of 
offices linked to each firm differs. Presumably, medium-sized businesses had more money to buy 
multiple offices in the center of Amsterdam. Often, smaller businesses were established around the 
outskirts of the central (shopping) part of Amsterdam. 
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A) Gerzon (Medium business) 
On Wednesday 4 December 1889, two brothers, Eduard and Lion Gerzon, opened 
their retail store on a property located at Nieuwendijk 163. Within forty years, the 
store became a famous retail store that expanded into three other properties in 
Amsterdam. It was famous for its fashionable but expensive men’s suits and 
women’s clothes. Their customers were mostly wealthy and highly regarded 
members of Dutch society. Even the royal family was a regular costumer at Gerzon.90 
 The business thrived at the beginning of the 20th century, which is why the 
two brothers put their business on the stock market. They remained on the Board of 
Directors and they made sure that the family would stay in control by owning the 
majority of the stock. Although the international financial crisis that struck the world 
in 1929 caused some problems, the company overcame this through clever marketing 
decisions. Instead of downsizing, Gerzon tried to expand through two initiatives. 
The first initiative was to double the amount of advertisements in newspapers.91 The 
second initiative was to open a store in the colony of the Dutch East Indies.92   
 During Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, Gerzon grew to become one of the 
biggest retail businesses in the Netherlands. However, Eduard Gerzon noted the 
changing political environment in Germany. After the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles in June 1919, Eduard said: ‘Europe will pay for this treaty, it is way too 
severe’.93 This prediction is probably the reason why the Gerzon brothers tried to 
secure the future of their company before World War II.  
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Figure A-2.  Gerzon Department Store on Kalverstraat.  
Left: An office of Gerzon established on the Kalverstraat in Amsterdam.   
source: 1[‘Google maps’, <https://www.google.nl/maps/place> Link: Gerzon (Consulted on 3 January 2017)]; 
Left: older photograph from 1890 with mannequins and clothing displayed in windows. [Kessels J.A.W, Het 
huis Gerzon: geschiedenis van een modehuis 1889-1964. (Amsterdam 1964) 29]. 
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Figure A-3.  Gerzon Department Store at the Nieuwedijk.  
Left is a Current photograph from Google maps    
source: [‘Google maps’, Link: Gerzon (Consulted on 03-01-2017); Right: older photograph from 1890 with 
mannequins and clothing displayed in windows [Kessels J.A.W, Het huis Gerzon: geschiedenis van een 
modehuis 1889-1964. (Amsterdam 1964) 29]. 
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Gerzon on the eve of the Second World War 
Kessels writes in the History of Gerzon that the family probably knew what would 
happen but they wanted to stay in charge of the business.94 However, the records 
show that something different occurred. The Jewish Board of Directors, the Gerzon 
brothers, Gustaav Hamburger, and Alfred Platz, came together in July 1939 to talk 
about the future of the company. The intention of the meetings was to ‘ensure that 
the family stock holdings were safe and to discuss a methodology that an eventual 
occupier never would get their hands on these stocks’.95 Specifically, the idea was 
that the Board of Directors would save some of the stock certificates somewhere in 
Switzerland. Their plans were so advanced that they even tried to set up a trust fund 
in Panama, which would have given management control over the stocks in 
Switzerland if something had happened.   
 In August of 1939, another portion of Gerzon stocks was given to confidants in 
England. In addition, they chose to change the complete Board of Directors to Aryan 
Dutch persons. However, after the Netherlands surrendered on 15 May 1940, the 
Germans did not believe that the store was completely Aryanized: it remained 
Jewish in the Germans’ eyes. 
 It became obvious that the Gerzons’ business would change hands when 
Eduard and Lion Gerzon and Arthur Marx, another member of the Board of 
Directors, received a letter from the Dutch society regarding the settlement of 
companies, known as Nagu. 96  This letter stated that the company would be 
confiscated because more than 25% of its stock was in the hands of Jews. All the stock 
and control over the eight offices would go to an Aryan Verwalter named Albert 
Walter Hermann Spiecker, who was originally from Berlin. Spiecker was already in 
the business of selling suits and trading fabrics. Gerzon was a good opportunity for 
him to expand his business in countries outside of Germany. According to the 
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Germans, the Gerzon Company was worth about 7 million Dutch Guilders at the 
time. 97 Spiecker would pay this amount to the Nagu and then the Nagu would pay it 
to the German government. Evidently out of the records it appears that Spiecker only 
paid 4 million Dutch guilders for a company that was worth much more.98   
 Spiecker’s desire to spread his businesses was hopeful, which is apparent in a 
letter to the German government where he mentions that he would ameliorate the 
‘’zehaffender organismus’ (value-creating organization) with his years of experience 
in running businesses.99 However, the Gerzon firm lost a lot of money under the 
Verwalter’s supervision. This is because personnel did not want to collaborate with 
the German occupier. Additionally, Gerzon’s machines and fabrics, which were 
needed for their own production, were confiscated by a company named ‘safe-in 
Mercurius’ to support the German war efforts. 
 One of the offices of Gerzon was in Hilversum, which Spiecker did not 
acquire.  Instead, on 13 September 1943, this office became part of the Association of 
Lingerie Fabrics.100 The owners, Mr. Lens and Mr. Weinberg, were not Jewish. This 
company had a mietvertrag absuschlussen, which means that they had the office under 
lease. It is clear from the records that Lens and Weinberg were forced to move to one 
of Gerzon’s old offices because their office had to be ceded to the Germans. In return, 
they had the possibility to use a formal office on the Kerkbrink in Hilversum. After 
the war, it turned out that the entire interior of the Gerzon office was taken away 
during the war. Therefore, everything that belonged to the Gerzon firm was removed 
from the offices. 
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B) Metz & Co (Medium business) 
A migrant from Metz, France, named Moses Samuel Metz, established a wholesale 
store of fabrics and ribbons in Amsterdam in 1776. After two generations, the store 
was sold to a nephew, named Isaac Cantor. He was added to the enterprise as a 
partner. The nephew added Co(mpany) to the name, making the company’s official 
title Metz & Co. Metz & Co grew in the nineteenth century because of good 
marketing. The company imported its products from London and they proved 
extremely popular in Amsterdam. Therefore, Metz & Co opened two new offices in 
Amsterdam in 1922 and 1927. Both of these offices stayed in business until their 
closure in 2013. All of the company’s businesses combined fashion with artistic 
influences. The elite from Amsterdam and some from Paris bought English fashion 
such as garments, women’s hats, needlework and most importantly furniture at Metz 
& Co in Amsterdam.101 In 1920, Joseph de Leeuw, another Jew, took ownership. 
Despite this change, the company’s name remained the same. After the international 
financial crisis in the 1929, de Leeuw saw his revenue drop. However, that was not 
his only problem. 
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Figure A-4.  An office of Metz & Co on the Keizersgracht around 1915 and 2017. 
Source [Metz & Co.eu, ‘original site of Metz & Co’, <metzco.eu> Metz&Co (Consulted on 20 December 2016)]; 
Inset: [‘Google maps’ Link: Google Maps (Consulted on 2 January 2017)].  
	
Metz & Co on the eve of WWII 
Metz & Co tried to avoid the misery of the economic crisis of 1929 by attracting 
people to its store by organizing fashion shows with themes such as traveling and 
vacation. During the 1930s, de Leeuw tried to create an airier and more pleasant 
atmosphere in the store. When the Germans occupied the Netherlands in May 1940, 
Metz & Co tried to continue business as usual.102 However, everything changed in 
August 1941 when de Leeuw and his Metz & Co businesses were confiscated and 
sold to an SS-officer named W.A.F. Harsch.103 First, in July 1941, Harsch promised 
that he would not hire any Jews in his firm. He also had to ensure that all the Jews 
who worked for Metz & Co did not have any influence or leadership in the company. 
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The exact date for the handover of the company was 12 August 1941. As mentioned 
in the record, he obtained full responsibility for the store, acquired access to all the 
liquid assets, and received full possession of all 400 shares of stocks. Later, in 1942, 
Harsch also gained possession over the three remaining production houses, which 
provided leather and textiles for Metz & Co.   
 As mentioned in the renewed registration at the chamber of commerce, the 
reason for this handover was because of the rule that all Jews had to be removed 
from businesses. 104  In 1942, de Leeuw also lost possession over his personal 
residences in Amsterdam. Harsch, who already owned his business firm, also tried to 
attain one of de Leeuw’s houses.105 However, Harsch was informed by a message that 
all of de Leeuw’s houses already belonged to a Verwaltung (German administrative) 
company. However, after some negotiating, Harsch also got possession of three of de 
Leeuw’s residences. 
 It is interesting that the transfer of the houses was included in the records. De 
Leeuw and Harsch agreed that Harsch would pay 420,000 Dutch Guilders for all of 
de Leeuw’s houses. Afterwards, it appears that this amount was deposited to the 
account of Metz & Co, Harsch’s new firm.106 Therefore, De Leeuw actually never 
received any money for his property.  
 Harsch was the new owner of Metz & Co, while Attorney Karel Hoogenberk 
was in charge.107This was a blessing in disguise. Under his charge, Metz & Co 
survived the horrors and economic failures of the war.108 This is because it had built 
up many reserves before the war. As a result, Hoogenberk could sell all the reserves 
that were stored in sheds during the war. Therefore, Metz & Co enjoyed a healthy 
economic position after the war. Despite this success, the personal losses caused 
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feelings of injustice. Joseph de Leeuw was murdered in Theresienstadt in 1943, along 
with many of his Jewish employees. Before the war began, Jozeph’s son, Hendrik de 
Leeuw, escaped to America. It is not clear from the sources how Hendrik got to 
America. However, after the war, he was the only person who could take charge of 
the business and who could fight for restitution and compensation.  
 
C) Vleeschpaleisch David van der Stam (Small business) 
David van der Stam, the first owner of the self-named butcher, was born in 
Amsterdam in 1886. A son of a butcher, he started his own business at a property on 
the Kinkerstraat 210-212 in Amsterdam’s Jewish neighborhood. 109  He had three 
children with his wife (a non-Jew). Unfortunately, there is not a lot of information 
about the store before WWII. However, by examining newspapers and archival 
records, it is possible to provide a short history of the firm. The years between 1920 
and 1930 were good years for the van der Stam butcheries. Over this period, his 
business was so successful that he opened two new butchers in Amsterdam. One of 
his businesses was located at Zeilstraat 31 and the other was located at the eerste van 
Swindenstraat 91, both outside of the Jewish neighborhood.110  Because it was a 
family business, his son and his nephew became co-owners of one of the new 
enterprises.111 All the stores sold non-Kosher meat and so most of his customers were 
non-Jewish customers.   
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Figure A-4 Top: An advertisement by the Meat Palace in the newspaper and the 
formal office of the butcher, which today is a supermarket (eerste van de 
Swindenstraat 91).  
Source: [‘Advertentiegpagina’, De Tijd: Godsdienstig-Staatkundig Nieuwsblad, 30-11-1932]; Bottom is current 
picture of site [‘Google maps’ Link: David van der Stam (Last consulted on 02-01-2017)]. 
 
David van der Stam on the eve of WWII  
The businesses owned by David van der Stam, his son and his cousin Jozeph became 
famous because of a demonstration by staff on 31 March 1937.112 The financial crisis 
had a major impact on every small or micro business. Many businesses specializing 
in vegetables, meat, and manufactured goods became bankrupt because of high taxes 
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and the reduced purchasing power of people in the Netherlands at the time.113 In 
addition, David van der Stam had to change the content of the contracts of his 
employees. Instead of permanent employment, they only could work on flexible 
contracts and they became temporary employees. As a reaction to their new 
situation, these employees started the first sit-down occupation in the Netherlands. 
The purpose of this demonstration was to occupy the store peacefully; doing nothing 
the whole day and waiting until demands for permanent contracts were granted.114 
Because David van der Stam needed his business, he ended the demonstration after a 
day by granting the previously mentioned demands. The consequences of this 
demonstration were enormous. Pictures of the protest appeared in every newspaper, 
which led to free advertising and more brand awareness. It was noted after these 
events that ‘the business had good revenue and a name to be proud of just before the 
war.’115  
 During WWII, David van der Stam no longer felt safe in Amsterdam. First, he 
saw that the Germans tried to counter all Jewish actions. Secondly, van der Stam 
received many anonymous death threats via phone calls.116 Because he took these 
threats very seriously, he relocated to Hoogkarspel, located in the north of the 
Netherlands. He gave his son and his cousin Jozeph responsibility for the company 
as he stepped aside. As van der Stam’s son and nephew were half-Jews, he hoped 
that the Germans would leave them alone. This strategy worked until 1942, as 
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proclaimed by Jozeph, ‘After the take-over of the business of my uncle, the following 
months were relatively calm’.117  
Unfortunately, ‘mischlings’ (racially mixed members of society who were 
considered by the Nazis to be of both Aryan and Jewish ancestry) were not allowed 
to keep their businesses. Therefore, by the end of 1942, the store was confiscated for 
2,199 Dutch Guilders and given to one of the butcher’s employees who was a 
member of the NSB. All of the butcher’s equipment was sold to Broekhofs 
vleeschhouwerijen en worstfabriek (butcher businesses and sausage fabrication). 
Broekhof used the money to open new butcher stores. In one of the records, Jozeph, 
the nephew of David, describes how he was present at the opening of Broekhof’s 
new business: ‘At the opening of their new store, Broekhof organized a party with 
some beautiful flowers. When I looked from the corner of the street inside the 
Broekhof store, I saw all my equipment standing the same as I had it in my store. I 
looked to this opening with understandable feelings’. 118  Presumably, he meant 
feelings of sadness. 
David van der Stam was hanged in Amersfoort concentration camp in 1943.119 
His family hid in Apeldoorn after they realized they would be forced to work in a 
camp for people who came from mixed marriages. The son and cousin of David 
survived the war and tried to attain restitution and compensation for the family’s 
losses in the war.   
	
D) Firma Alex Citroen (Small store) 
In 1887, Alexander Citroen started a wholesale business for home supplies in 
Amsterdam, and he named the business Firma Alex Citroen. The store was located in 
a canal house at Singel 324 in Amsterdam. Because there is not a lot of secondary 
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literature available about this business, I used mostly primary sources to describe the 
story of Firma Citroen. All of these records are available in the Amsterdam archives. 
Alexander Citroen owned the business until his death in 1915. There were three 
stores, one in The Hague, one in Rotterdam and one in Amsterdam.120 When he died 
in 1926, his wife, Mathilde Citroen, became director and performed leadership duties 
until 1931, when her son Karel was old enough to take over the director position. 
After the transfer of leadership, the business ownership was divided between Karel 
and his mother. This would ultimately be a problem after the war. Under Karel’s 
leadership, from 1931 to 1977, he had to overcome many disappointments. In 1927, a 
fire that raged on the Singel Street in Amsterdam destroyed Firma Alex Citroen.121 
The walls of the firm were destroyed and the stockroom burned to the  
ground. 122  After these setbacks, he rebuilt and resupplied the firm completely. 
However, new misfortunes would come soon. 
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Figure A-5. Top and bottom left: The office of Firma Citroen at the Singel 324, circa 1920.   
 source: [Stadsarchief Amsterdam, image library, search term: Singel 324];  Bottom 
right: Current photograph of building in 2017 [‘Google maps’, Link: Firma Citroen (Consulted on 2-1-2017)]. 
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Firma Citroen on the Eve of WWII 
As mentioned before, the financial crisis and the additional measures the 
government took had a huge impact on small and micro firms. The firm openly 
complained about the government’s decision to raise a sales tax on sold goods.123 The 
Dutch government tried to diminish the national debt with these tax revenues. 
However, the governmental order was detrimental for the retail trade. The sales tax 
placed an additional cost on businesses and proved counterproductive since 
consumer demand dropped. Firma Citroen tried to survive by having a presence at 
all the emergency fairs.124 These fairs were important to firms who faced difficulties. 
During these fairs, firms could sell their products in a big warehouse to people from 
all over the country. It is one of the reasons why Firma Citroen still made a small 
profit of approximately 26,000 guilders in 1933. 125  In the following years, the 
economy improved. Therefore, the Citroen family had an overall equity of 11 million 
Dutch guilders at the beginning of the war.126   
 On 27 August 1941, the Citroen Company was taken over by Verwalter H.E.A. 
Engels. He was a member of the Dutch SS 127  and already owned other Jewish 
companies.128 Karel Citroen describes in his letter to the investigation team of war 
offenders how Engels and his wife, Cornelia Morelus, used his possessions. First, 
they moved all the interior and accessories to other businesses that were already in 
their possession. Secondly, they changed the name of the stores to the ‘Dutch 
Household Expenses’ to conceal that it was once a Jewish business. Karel survived 
the war by going into hiding with his family. Fortunately, he was smart enough to 
																																								 																				
123 ‘De omzetbelasting. Bezwaren der behangers’, Algemeen Handelsblad, 03-05-1933. 
124 ‘Advertentiepagina’, Provinciale Overĳsselsche en Zwolsche Courant: Staats-, Handels-, Nieuws- en         
Advertentieblad, 03-08-1940. 
125 SAA, KCFAC, inv. 30651 fo. 171. 
126 Ibid.   
127 The Dutch SS was formed in September 1940 and was renamed the Germaansche SS in Nederland (Germanic 
SS in the Netherlands) in November 1942. 
128 Ibid., 121. 
	53	
save some of his family’s most valuable possessions in a hiding place.129 However, 
retrieving all of his confiscated business possessions from Engels would be a struggle 
for him after the war. 
 
E) Firma M. Walg & Zn. (Micro store) 
Nathan Walg was born in 1888 in Alkmaar. He married Rebecca de Vries and they 
had three children. Together they moved to Amsterdam and sold fruit and 
vegetables in a local market. In 1910, they started a family business enterprise in the 
Amstelkade called Firma M. Walg & Zn. The story of this firm is a good example for 
lots of other Jewish businesses. The earlier stories of larger firms in the Jewish 
community, such as Gerzon and Metz & Co, are an exception to the general Jewish 
experiences of restitution.130 Approximately 45 percent of the Jews in Amsterdam 
were active in retail businesses at the beginning of the 20th century. More specifically, 
from the 49,823 Jews who were employed in the Netherlands, 3,816 Jews worked in 
the food business around the year 1930.131 There was a lot of competition, and most 
of the demand came from the Jewish community. Firma Walg & Zn. focused on 
Jewish customers because they sold kosher fruit and vegetables. Later, they also sold 
cheese that was ritually prepared, blessed, and approved as kosher by the rabbinate 
of Amsterdam.132  
 According to articles in the Dutch-Jewish newspaper, Nieuw Israelietisch 
Weekblad, Firma Walg&Zn. was very involved in the Jewish community. During 
every Jewish High Holiday or important festivity, the firma Walg&Zn. was thanked 
for providing free biscuits that they donated to the Jewish community. 133 
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Unfortunately, there is no business data available about this firm in the archives. 
Nevertheless, it is very likely that the family Walg lived on the edge of survival. 
According to Blom and Cohen, most of the small Jewish retail businesses were 
dependent on charity within the Jewish community as these families fought for their 
personal and business existence, especially during the 1930s. 134  However, the 
economic anti-Semitism at the time created a perception that Jews worked together, 
and therefore owners of small Jewish businesses were viewed as rich, money-
hungry, and unfair competition.135   
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Figure A-6. Top: Firma M. Walg at the Centrale Markthallen, circa 1934.   
Source:[Website architecture center]Amsterdam, initiative of the foundation architecture, <http://www.arcam.n
l/en/centrale-markthal/> Link: Centrale markthallen   (Consulted on 2-1-2017); Bottom: Current Firma M. 
Walg building.  
[Website erfgoed stem, initiative of the ministry of cultural heritage, <https://erfgoedstem.nl/boei-verkrijgt-
erfpacht-centrale-markthal-amsterdam/> Link: Centrale markthallen  (Consulted on 02-01-2017)]. 
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Firma Walg & Zn. on the Eve of WWII 
Michmam and Been state that most Jewish sole-proprietor shops suffered from the 
enormous economic fluctuations in the 1930s. 136  Fruit and vegetables were 
considered secondary necessities at a time of this financial crisis. This is because 
these commodities were considered products that were profitable for only a limited 
amount of people. This may explain the reason why Firma Walg had to sell one of 
their businesses in Rotterdam to the Firma Cohen in 1932.137 However, the economy 
did eventually improve and Firma Walg&Zn. survived the difficult economic times. 
Before the war, they were even able to open a completely renovated store in 
Rotterdam with brand new equipment. The newspaper Nieuw Israelietisch Weekblad 
even describes this business establishment as a ‘beautiful, new, modern store.’138  
 In 1942, the store was confiscated under paragraph 7 of the German orders on 
Dutch businesses. This meant that the store was seized under a regulation that was 
designed to force all Jews out of Dutch economic life.139 The Verwalter appointed for 
this business was a Dutch participant in the NSB: Franciscus Beugel. During the war, 
he continued the business as a non-kosher vegetable and fruit store. The name of the 
store under Beugel is not in the archive. The Walg family chose to go into hiding to 
try to escape the German cruelties. Unfortunately, Nathan and one of his sons, Moses, 
were the family’s only survivors. They tried with Cohen, who bought one of the 
businesses in the 1930s, to receive restitution for their possessions. They also tried to 
agree on a compensation amount for all the financial damages suffered during the 
war.   
 
 
																																								 																				
136 J Michman, H. Beem and D. Michman, Geschiedenis van de Joodse gemeenschap in Nederland (Jerusalem 1985) 128-
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137 ‘Afslag-Bericht’, Nieuw Israelitisch Weekblad, 30-09-1932. 
138 ‘Fa. Walg’, Het Vaderland: Staat-en Letterkundig Nieuwsblad, 25-07-1940. 
139 NA, RRR, inv. 2.09.48.02 fo. 721, 38K/46. 
	57	
F) Firma H.L. Granaat (Micro store) 
Hijman Levie Granaat established his firm on 23 November 1880. It was located at 
Oude Schans 15 in Amsterdam. He and his wife, Hanna Khan, developed a metal 
and iron supply firm. Levie Granaat was deeply connected with the Jewish 
community. He offered free meals for the Jewish poor on Shabbat evenings, during 
the High Holidays, and on Chanukah.140 The Jewish community deeply appreciated 
his generosity.141 Levie Granaat retired in 1911. His two sons, Louis and Samuel, 
inherited the business. They developed the store into a well-known brand in semi-
manufacturing that included copper sheets and copper plinths or slabs. They had 
important customers and delivered materials to the palace on Dam Square. It 
becomes clear from one of the catalogues before the war that the store also sold 
kettles, cylinders, hinges and nails. The annual figures of the business between 1911 
and 1941 looked very impressive. They had extensive cash equity and a large 
inventory waiting to be sold. 
 The result of this growing prosperity was that the Firma Granaat could 
expand. In the 30 years before the war, they became the owners of multiple buildings 
from Oude Schans 11 to 15. Interestingly, the business never had more than six 
employees.   
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Figure A-7.  Firma Granaat at the Oudeschans. 
Source: Left photo: Date unknown. [Website Joods Amsterdam, <http://www.joodsamsterdam.nl/h-l-granaat/> 
Link: Firma Granaat (Consulted on 1-1-2017)]; 
Source:  Right photo: Current picture [‘Google Maps’, Link: Firma Granaat (Consulted on 2-1-2017)].142 
 
Firma Granaat on the Eve of WWII  
The Granaat family was a real business family. Louis and Samuel continued the 
family business. Their brother Willem started the same type of business on the other 
side of the street and another brother Maurits started a pickle store on the Utrechtse 
straat. Interestingly, all of the brothers except Louis Granaat were married to Jewish 
women. Louis lived on the second floor of the store and his second wife was a 
catholic woman. This probably saved his life during WWII.  
 The Germans invaded the Netherlands in 1940. At the time, Jewish merchants 
had to declare their race and were forced to send their material assets to the Germans. 
The German government ordered Jewish businesses to declare the worth of each of 
their individual stores. In a futile attempt to keep the ownership of the store, Louis 
wrote to the Germans, informing them that he was in a mixed marriage. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the Germans did not make an exception. 
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 Louis and Samuel tried to save as much of their possessions as possible. First, 
they threw some of their copper stock into the canal. The idea was to ferret this out 
after the liberation of the Netherlands. Second, they used some of the money from 
the company to buy stocks in America. They believed that an investment abroad was 
safe because they thought that America would not get involved in the war. 
Eventually, the brothers had to leave the store around 1941, when a Verwalter was 
appointed: Jean Engels. When Engels found out that the brothers had siphoned off 
some of their wealth, he sent a letter to the Germans to confiscate their stocks in 
America. Meanwhile, Engels tried to personally profit as much from the company as 
possible. Instead of putting money in the cash register, he kept everything in his own 
pocket. Therefore, the business was almost bankrupt by 1944. When the German 
authorities inquired about what had happened, one of the old employees of Louis 
and Samuel Granaat, named Kampfens, told the Germans how Engels committed 
fraud. The Germans fired Engels as Verwalter and closed the store. It is not known 
whether a new Verwalter was ever assigned or whether any attempt to restart the 
business was made between 1944 and 1945. 
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Chapter 3: Jewish companies’ experience of 
restitution (1945-1960) 
Eric Slot: ‘The robbed had to negotiate with the thief and his henchman’.143  
According to Veraart, restitution failed not because of personal interests but because 
of juridical mistakes.144 He mentions that the question is not necessarily if somebody 
wanted to return the stolen goods. The problem was that the juridical laws 
addressing the subject of property made restitution difficult.145 A new owner may 
have received a property and its contents in good faith or by a contractual 
arrangement.  
 After confiscation, Jewish owned property often passed through several 
hands, including those of the Verwalter. In some cases, the Verwalter did not have any 
apparent link to the Fascist occupation and its Dutch collaborators. In such instances, 
it became more difficult for judges to refund the possessions to the formal owner. It 
was believed that such actions would diverge from judicial aequalitas (balance and 
equal access) under the Dutch guiding principles of its legal system, as one of the 
parties could be unfairly penalized (especially in the absence of explicit 
documentation showing the confiscation and illegal transfer of ownership). This was 
one of the problems the Dutch government faced when trying to return to the rule of 
law and administration of justice.  
 Another obstacle that prevented prompt restitution of Jewish owned 
properties after WWII was that the extent of the looting was not traceable. Archives 
were often incomplete and the Germans often burned records.146 There was also a lot 
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146 C. van Renselaar, Roof en Restitutie van het bezit van de Joden in Nederland 1940-1999: Uitkomsten van recent 
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at stake financially for many big companies who profited greatly from Jewish 
property. Consequentially, these companies tried to extend the length of time 
lawsuits dragged on for to further their own economic interests. 147 Additionally, the 
Dutch government did not have any desire to participate in extensive investigations 
and long lawsuits. They were trying to rebuild the Netherlands and to regain 
possession of its former colonies, especially Indonesia. 
In cases decided by the Commission of Reparations, Jews were expected to accept 
what was offered without disrupting the country’s reconstruction.148 To summarize, 
the literature that addresses restitution criticizes 1) the German occupiers, 2) the 
Dutch judicial system, 3) the Dutch government, and 4) other organizations and 
institutions. Before I answer which Jewish companies were most affected by the 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain prompt restitution after WWII, I will introduce the 
institutional organizations involved in restitution that were created by the Dutch 
government. Through these institutions, Jews could reclaim their properties.  
 Already by 1943, the formal Dutch government, which had fled to England, 
began to discuss the post-war restitution process. They talked about how assets 
confiscated by traitors and Germans would be returned to their formal owners.149 The 
government considered traitors to be Dutch people who profited from collaborating 
with the occupiers. Consequently, all traitors would also be tried. Dutch 
collaborators and Germans were aware of this and fled immediately after the 
liberation of the Netherlands to Germany in search of a haven.150 Because of the 
shortage of housing in Germany – the Allies bombed many houses – the Dutch 
collaborators and Germans ended up in refugee camps where they stayed for seven 
months. When the Allies also liberated Germany from the Nazi regime (25 April 
1945), most of the NSB’ers were required to return home to the Netherlands to face 
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trial. The Netherlands also wanted to prosecute certain Germans. However, Germans 
often avoided the Dutch justice system because the post-war Dutch government did 
not have the resources to locate them. Later in my thesis, it will be clear why the 
inability to trace Germans had an immense impact on the Dutch restitution process. 
 Following the return of the Dutch collaborators to the Netherlands, it was 
possible to refund some of the stolen assets that these individuals possessed. The 
Dutch government gradually established three institutions to implement the 
restitution process. First, the Dutch government appointed a judicial counsel of 
restitution in August 1945.151 The government divided the counsel into three sections 
to address stolen property: 1) immovable valuables, 152  2) stocks, and 3) looted 
inventories. This judicial council was responsible for judging the Jewish claims and 
facilitating agreements between the rightful Jewish owners and the immediate 
postwar owners of the properties. In most cases, there was no possibility for an 
appeal because the judicial council followed ministerial instructions (a government 
mandate).153 While the concept of Trias Politica in the Netherlands was designed to 
prevent the concentration of power, during the post-war era, the juridical council  
prohibited appeals in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the state as quickly as 
possible.154.  
 Secondly, the counsel only made judgements when the Jewish owner and the 
immediate postwar owner did not reach an agreement.. 155  However, as Slot 
mentions, it was impossible for Jews to negotiate amicably with somebody who was 
a thief in their eyes.156 A second institution where Jews could claim their 
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possessions was the Liquidation of Verwaltung Sarphatistraat (LVVS). The Dutch 
government appointed administrators to manage the money that the looting bank, 
Lippmann&Co., possessed. The idea behind this institution was that Jews could 
claim their financial compensation at the LVVS.157 The concept was that the LVVS 
would find all the original owners or their descendants. If they could not find the 
original owners or their relatives, cash would be transferred to an institution named 
Jewish Social Work. The LVVS’s main problem was when the pre-war owner and the 
postwar owner, who had no apparent link to the fascist occupiers and collaborators, 
both claimed the possessions.158   
 According to Staal, there were two solutions for this dilemma. The first 
solution was that all the possessions would be given back to the pre-war owner and 
the postwar owner would receive compensation. The second solution would be that 
the pre-war owner would be given compensation while the possession stayed in the 
hands of the postwar owner. A problem for the Jews was the presumption of 
innocence, which meant Jews had to prove the guilt of the postwar owner. The 
immediate postwar owner was always innocent until proven guilty.159   
 A third and final establishment for restitution was the Dutch Management 
Institute. The government created this institution to reconstitute the board of 
directors of various companies back to their original composition after the Second 
World War. They could suspend, fire and appoint people. When there was no other 
alternative to establishing an old board because of death or disappearance of the 
persons, they had the power to take over the business for an undetermined amount 
of time. The Dutch Management Institute’s second task was managing all the liquid 
assets confiscated by a Verwalter that Jewish owner never reclaimed. Between its 
establishment in 1945 and its dissolution in 1955, the Dutch Management Institute 
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endured a lot of criticism. As the newspaper De Tijd wrote: ‘the institute made some 
awkward decisions in difficult situations.’ 160  The cause of this criticism will be 
described in further detail below.   
 In the next section, I will investigate whether there was a difference in 
restitution and compensation between micro, small and medium companies. For this 
investigation, I will discuss the period of restitution (1945-1960) between the six 
previously mentioned companies. I choose to describe the lawsuits and claims per 
possession instead of chronologically because there was no appointed end date for 
the process of restitution and compensation. The length of the processing of claims 
for restitution varied because the duration for each process differed.   
 The below table contains details about the confiscated firms, the ownership 
before and after confiscation and the names of the claimants who demanded 
restitution after the Second World War. 
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161 The confiscators were non-Jews who bought the property from the German government. Nazi-Germany 
confiscated all the businesses of Jews during the Second World War. 
Firm 
Ownership 
before start of 
WWII in Europe 
(1939) 
Confiscator161 awarded 
ownership during WWII 
(1940 to 1945)/ nationality 
Claimant(s) demanding 
restitution after WWII 
(between 1945 and 
1960).  
Gerzon 1) G. Hamburger 
2) A. Marx 
3) E. Gerzon 
4) L. Gerzon 
5) J. E. Gerzon 
6) G.F. Vromans 
7) C. Marx 
8) E.L. Wolff 
1) Albert Walter Hermann 
Spiecker (German) 
 2) Safe-in Mercurius 
(Dutch) 
3) Association of the 
Lingerie fabrics (Dutch) 
1) A. Marx 
2) G.F. Vromans 
3) C. Marx 
4) E.L. Wolff 
Metz&Co Joseph de Leeuw W.A.F. Harsch (German) 1) Hendrik de Leeuw 
2) Henriette de Leeuw 
3) Kitty de Leeuw 
Van der 
Stam 
David van der 
Stam 
 
Broekhofs butcher stores 
and sausage fabric 
(Dutch) 
1) Joseph van der Stam 
2) Louis van der Stam 
Firma 
Alex 
Citroen 
Karel Citroen 1) H.E.A. Engels (Dutch) 
2) H.W. Nagel (German) 
Karel Citroen 
Firma 
M. Walg 
Nathan Walg Franciscus Beugel  
(Dutch) 
1) Nathan Walg 
2) Moses Walg 
Firma 
H.L. 
Granaat 
1) Louis Granaat 
2) Samuel 
Granaat 
Jean Engels 
(Unknown) 
Louis Granaat 
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A) Gerzon (Medium store) 
A month after the Netherlands was liberated in May 1945, the Dutch Management 
Institute immediately tried to reconstitute the old board of directors to Arthur Marx 
and G.F. Vromans, who were also on the board of directors before the war.162 The 
newly appointed board of directors for the Gerzon Department Store found the store 
in a neglected condition. The Germans stole 16 of the company’s vans. They also took 
merchandise, such as furniture, gloves, stockings, and fur coats. Additionally, they 
brought 250 industrial assembly machines to Germany or demolished them.163 Before 
Gerzon could reclaim anything, a German insurance company sued them. As a 
result, they had to pay 27,000 Dutch guilders because they did not pay any of their 
insurance during the war. However, because all of the transactions made during the 
war were found to be invalid, the payment was returned. The issue addressing 
unpaid taxes may also explain why Gerzon took time to start their formal claim for 
restitution.  
 Gerzon had its first victory in 1946 when the Board of Restitution declared the 
purchase agreement of 1943 invalid. As I mentioned earlier, there were different 
departments for different sorts of restitution. Consequentially, as the Board of 
Restitution mentioned, movable and immovable possessions that belonged to Gerzon 
at that time could only be reclaimed by summoning other departments of the Board 
of Restitution.  
 Arthur Marx, a member of the board of directors after the war, suggested that 
‘There should not be a separation between the restitution of the companies’ because 
the Verwalter, Spiecker, received both immovable and movable values during the 
war. Marx also did not see any reason to compensate Spiecker for the money that 
was used to confiscate the store because the money that Spiecker paid never reached 
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any of the formal owners of Gerzon. Instead, it went directly to Lippmann & Co.164  
 Spiecker sold movable and immovable goods for millions of Dutch guilders to 
a company named ‘Safe-in Mercurius’, a company that confiscated Gerzon’s goods to 
support the German war efforts. It appeared that Spiecker had taken out a mortgage 
of 2.5 million Dutch guilders on the building of Gerzon. He needed the money for a 
repayment of the debts of Gerzon, which amounted to 600,000 Dutch guilders. It is 
unknown what happened with the rest of the 2.5 million Dutch guilders. When the 
mortgage bank heard of the upcoming restitution case, they sent a letter to Gerzon 
stating that to own the offices again, Gerzon would have to pay 2.5 million Dutch 
guilders.165 The representatives of Gerzon answered that it was ‘both Spiecker and 
the Firma Mercurius who were responsible for acting inequitably’. They explained 
that Spiecker and Mercurius used the money from the ‘mortgage, and so are fully 
responsible for its repayment’. Additionally, they did not have anything to do with 
all that happened with Gerzon between 1943 and 1945.166 Spiecker did not want to 
pay the amount; he pointed to the fact that he agreed with Mercurius that the 
mortgage was included in the price during the transfer of firm to Gerzon.167 On the 
other hand, Mercurius stated that ‘The 1944 purchase is totally annulled’.168  
The mortgage bank wanted to claim the money from the Firma Gerzon. Their 
argument was that the money was used for the redemption of pre-war debts and that 
they were the current owners of the mentioned buildings.169  
 The department responsible for immovable values within the Board of 
Restitution discussed the issue during the restitution process in 1948. The Board of 
Restitution came up with the following conclusions: 1) The deal between Lippmann 
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& Co and Spiecker was invalid; 2) the agreement between Spiecker and Mercurius 
concerning the immovable goods was invalid; 3) the agreement between Spiecker 
and Mercurius concerning passing on the mortgage on the immovable goods was 
invalid; and 4) the claim of mortgage on the immovable goods by the mortgage bank 
was invalid.170 This led to the return of the immovable values without any mortgage 
to Firma Gerzon, and the mortgage bank did not have any rights to reclaim any 
money. All the judgements were tested and assured by regulation 145/194, decision E 
93.171 The regulation considered all the transactions made during the war period 
invalid. As a reaction to the judgement, Gerzon told the press and all of the 
stockholders of the company the following: ‘an important issue is settled favorably 
for Gerzon. Yet this does not mean that past suffering is erased, but it is an important 
step towards a bright future’.172  
 A second restitution process started between the earlier mentioned 
Association of Lingerie Fabrics and Gerzon. The Association of Lingerie Fabrics was 
forced to start its business in one of the old buildings of Gerzon. Because the Firma 
Gerzon paid the rent during the war, Gerzon wanted compensation from the 
Association of Lingerie Fabrics. In addition, Gerzon wanted compensation for the 
loss of the original interior. In total, Gerzon ordered the Association of Lingerie 
Fabrics to pay 21,000 Dutch guilders.173 The former owners of the Association of 
Lingerie Fabrics wanted to pay the money but had two problems. First, the Firma did 
not exist anymore because of bankruptcy. Second, the director who was previously 
in charge died during a bombardment. Because Gerzon did not want another 
lawsuit, they tried to make an agreement with the descendants of the Association of 
Lingerie Fabric. They agreed that the descendants would pay the money back when 
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they received compensation from the German government. Finally, Gerzon received 
the money four years after sending the first letter to the Association of Lingerie 
Fabrics. The third example shows how the size of the company influenced 
decision making in the case of restitution. In a letter to Jitta, another (not family 
related) Holocaust survivor who tried to reclaim goods, it becomes clear that the 
receiver of compensation had to pay corporation tax and capital gains tax.174 So as the 
V.V.R.A. mentioned: from every 100,000 Dutch guilders received in compensation, 
the tax authorities would get another 52,000 Dutch guilders. However, because 
Gerzon was able to avail of experienced and skilled lawyers, they knew that a 
lawsuit challenging such tax would be expensive and the chances of winning were 
low. Lawyers for Gerzon carried out test cases where it became clear that a judge 
would support the tax authorities. Representatives of Gerzon wrote in a letter to Jitta 
the following: ‘If you still want to go to court, maybe we can combine our forces’.175 
The representative notes that this action would probably have more chance of 
succeeding. Yet, after all, the taxes still had to be paid. Nevertheless, these examples 
make clear that having a good lawyer and good connections contributed to making 
sensible decisions.  
 After the restitution of properties, Gerzon tried to obtain compensation for the 
lost income and damages caused during the Second World War. Gerzon told one 
newspaper: ‘After this important judgement, we can proceed to determine a claim’.176 
For this claim they had to turn to another department of restitution. As earlier 
mentioned, the compensation for immovable and movable goods had to be claimed 
separately. According to Meijer, the Dutch government chose to divide the Board of 
Restitution into different sections for two reasons. The first reason was that these 
sections would fit better with the idea of the separation of power in the Dutch legal 
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system. Secondly, it would reduce the workload managed by the Board of 
Restitution.177   
 According to the bookkeeper of Gerzon, the company made loss claims for 
more than 500 million Dutch guilders. This included an outstanding balance of an 
existing mortgage, so in the end there was a request for restitution of approximately 
285 million guilders.178 This compensation was meant to be regulated under decision 
E133 (enemy property, article 28, paragraph.179 In 1951, Gerzon received another 
671,000 Dutch guilders, money that was recovered from the bank account of 
Spiecker.180 Gerzon heard from hired advisors that it was better to deposit the money 
in a pension fund, otherwise companies had to pay 52% tax on compensated money. 
For big companies, such as Gerzon, who did not need the money immediately, it was 
more profitable to deposit the money in a fund.181 Yet, even after Gerzon received all 
this compensation, the company was unable to survive the damage caused by 
German occupation and the Holocaust. By the end of the 1960s, descendants of the 
old board of directors sold the company to a third party. 
	
	
B) Metz & Co (Medium store) 
In 1944, the Harsch family, the Verwalters of Metz & Co, probably saw that the war 
was going to end with a victory for the allies. To preserve the money that they 
received from the Firma Metz & Co, Harsch tried to deposit the entire firm’s money 
into their personal accounts. As Mr. Harsch died at the end of WWII, Mrs. Harsch 
became the sole owner of the firm. The first records show that Mrs. Harsch deposited 
two thousand Dutch guilders belonging to the Metz & Co firm into her own 
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account.182 In the year between 1944 and 1945, the Harsch family deposited more 
than ten thousand Dutch guilders into their personal accounts.  
 In 1945, when the de Leeuw family returned to Amsterdam, it was clear that 
members of the family died during the war. From the seven family members living 
before the war, four died during the Holocaust. Mr. and Mrs. Joseph de Leeuw and 
their two youngest children did not survive the war crimes committed by the Nazis 
and died in Theresienstadt and Auschwitz. Therefore, there were only three children 
who could reclaim the family’s possessions after the war. Two of the surviving 
children moved immediately to New York in 1945. The son of Joseph de Leeuw 
stayed in Amsterdam, but was unable to deal with the restitution process alone. 
Thus, all the children agreed to hire the lawyer and prosecutor van Hattum as their 
legal representative.183  
 Van Hattum first tried to reclaim all of Metz & Co. business’ possessions. In 
doing so, he sent a letter to the Dutch Management Institute in August 1946. Van 
Hattum claimed that the board of governance appointed by the Harsch Family, the 
Verwalters of Metz & Co, should resign immediately to make space for the old board 
of governance, specifically the de Leeuw family.184 In other words, the stocks of Metz 
& Co that Harsch possessed had to be returned to the descendants of Joseph de 
Leeuw. The response from the Dutch Management Institute was that they wanted to 
be paid fifty Dutch guilders up-front in exchange for their assistance in the field of 
restitution.185 After receiving the payment of fifty guilders, the Dutch Management 
Institute ordered both parties to wait five years for the restitution process to begin. 
This is because the Dutch Management Institute thought that it was not beneficial for 
Metz & Co’s ownership to be transferred too quickly. This may have reflected the 
fear of the government that a transition of power that was too hasty could hinder the 
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developing Dutch economy. The economic environment was already chaotic, 
therefore changing the Board of Directors at this fragile time could result in the 
bankruptcy of Metz & Co. 
 A second reason why the restitution did not begin immediately was that at 
that time it was still not clear what happened to Joseph de Leeuw and his other 
family members who perished in the Holocaust.186 The Dutch Bank already froze 
Mrs. Harsch’s accounts so she could not use or transfer any money that belonged to 
Metz & Co.  
 On 20 March 1950, notaries and deputies of the former and current owners of 
Metz & Co. met to discuss the restitution of all of the company’s possessions. The 
meeting was held to ‘avoid a lawsuit’ and to ‘come to an amicable restitution without 
any difficulties’. 187  The following seven agreements were made in 1950: 1) the 
certificate of liquidation, signed in 1942 by de Leeuw and Harsch, would be 
considered invalid. Every change in the property deed made after 1942 also became 
invalid. The likely reason behind this decision was because the de Leeuw family 
wanted to avoid a lawsuit against Mrs. Harsch. She possessed the stocks. Therefore, 
she could claim that she was not involved in Mr. Harsch’s business and that she 
acquired the stocks in good faith; 2) the restitution would include everything that 
Metz & Co. owned before its liquidation in 1942; 3) all debts made my Harsch in the 
name of Metz & Co. would become expenses for Harsch’s descendants. However, 
this excluded normal corporate debt, which was already factored in, but included 
mortgage debts; 4) there would be a future negotiation regarding the interior of the 
houses that belonged to the formal owners: Metz & Co. However, Mrs. Harsch 
would already lose the ownership of the houses, because they were still the firm’s 
property; 5) the Harsch Family would admit guilt in front of the family de Leeuw 
and would pay all the fines for damages. This means they would pay all the damages 
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on the immovable values. Thereby, they would refund 519,450.90 Dutch guilders 
immediately from Mrs. Harsch’s account; 6) the Harsch family would pay 36,509 
Dutch guilders to de Leeuw. This amount equaled the sum Harsch paid to the tax 
authorities during the war. The judge proposed that Mrs. Harsch could try to reclaim 
the money later from the tax authorities. They also used company money to pay 
direct transfer tax in 1944 when Mr. Harsch died and gave the property to Mrs. 
Harsch; and 7) the de Leeuw family lost the right to claim more than the possessions 
that were discussed during the meeting.188 My hypothesis is that the judge wanted 
this to be signed because he was afraid that the de Leeuw family would return to 
court with new restitution demands.   
 Mrs. Harsch signed the settlement for the restitution agreement between 1950 
and 1951. She probably knew there was enough evidence that Mr. Harsch bought the 
confiscated company in bad faith. There is even evidence for this in the attached 
minutes of the settlement meeting. In these records, it appears that the only reason 
for the liquidation of Metz & Co. was Joseph van de Leeuw’s Jewish background. In 
the same records, the attendees who were present during the liquidation of 1942 
stated that Mr. Harsch knew this.189 Unfortunately, there is no proof that this was the 
main reason why Mrs. Harsch signed the agreement. 
 In the 1950s, Metz & Co. grew as quickly as the Dutch economy. Supply grew 
and the store experienced economic growth by frequently hosting fashion shows.190 
In the 1950s, Metz & Co received compensation for the affected damages during the 
war. Although this data is not attached in the archive, newspapers wrote about it. In 
1950, Metz & Co. received 416,364.18 Dutch guilders from the V.V.R.A. as 
compensation for the sale of their property during the war.191 Unfortunately, the total 
amount of money Metz & Co. got back as compensation is unknown.   
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 The archive mentions that the family was reminded of the war when the 
Board of Restitution sent them a letter. According to the letter, Mrs. Harsch still 
owned some company stocks in Germany. However, it was impossible to reclaim 
stocks owned by people in foreign countries before 1957. The letter further explained 
that this German law changed after 1957. Jews who lost their stocks because of the 
liquidation of Lippmann & Co. were qualified to receive compensation for the lost 
stocks. The board already had the relevant data to make this claim to the LVVS, and 
they knew how many stocks were stored at the bank during the war. Therefore, the 
de Leeuw family only had to sign some papers to complete this compensation 
process. However, the Board of Restitution explained that it was not certain that it 
could get compensation for all Jews. This is because only some famous Jewish people 
succeeded in getting any sort of restitution.192 However, the Board also noted that 
they felt an attempt should be made to attain this restitution.  
 The de Leeuw family did not respond to the Board of Restitution’s letter. 
However, in August 1963 after a third letter from the Board asked again for the 
papers to be signed, the youngest son of Jozeph de Leeuw finally signed the forms 
for German compensation.193 Metz & Co. continued to run its store until 1973 and 
then sold it to its formal supplier, Firma Liberty.  
 
C) Vleeschpaleisch David van der Stam (Small store) 
When Joseph van der Stam returned to Amsterdam after the war, he was grateful 
that he survived the terrible circumstances by hiding. As he stated: ‘I came back with 
energy and pent up desire to start working’.194 He believed that he could fulfil these 
desires and expected to have his confiscated goods returned. His beliefs were also 
encouraged when he read about Decision E100: All the injustice of the occupation 
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and the sidelining of the judiciary (vermogensrechterlijke) had to be undone.195 More 
specifically, Decision E100 was interpreted to mean that every Verwalter, NSBer, or 
Dutch collaborator who acquired possessions wrongly from Jewish entrepreneurs 
had to transfer these confiscated properties and goods back as soon as possible.196 
However, the same article also mentions that ‘While the government tries to reverse 
these transactions as soon as possible, we assume that there are some very 
complicated cases.’197   
 When Joseph van der Stam tried to get his business back, it appears that his 
case was complicated. As he mentions, not a single institution for restitution was able 
to ‘help him get his confiscated goods back’.198 Consequently, he hired a lawyer. He 
received advice to request restitution for all the goods that were in possession of the 
vleeschpaleisch before the war that came into the possession of a Verwalter. The 
Verwalter told van der Stam that he sold all the goods to a third party. When van der 
Stam finally found his possessions, the new owner told him that he received the 
possessions in good faith. Therefore, van der Stam and the third party tried to come 
to an agreement without going to court. However, they could not agree and therefore 
eventually ended up in court. Jozeph van der Stam explained later when he wrote to 
the court why a verdict of the judge was necessary: ‘Months passed and we did not 
come to any solution.’199  
 Finally, Jozeph and the son of David who was in hiding during the war, 
returned to Amsterdam. Together, they started to pressure on the person who 
possessed their former property and filed a lawsuit. They did so not only because 
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they saw this as their right, but also because it was the only way to recover some 
money. The case was deemed an unimportant matter. In the meantime, the family 
van der Stam had to survive on only 30 Dutch guilders per week. As he states in his 
memoir: ‘You understand that a family cannot live with such a small amount of 
money. I yearned for the moment I would get my possessions back’.200 However, the 
court decision did not work out as van der Stam hoped. The Verwalter, Mr. Broekhof, 
tried in every way to counteract the restitution. In earlier described cases, there was 
always help from the LVVS, who typically possessed a bill of sale between 
Lippmann & Co. and the administrator. However, in van der Stam’s case, it 
appeared that all the transactions mysteriously disappeared. Consequentially, 
Broekhof told van der Stam that he only came into possession of some specific goods. 
According to van der Stam the Verwalter lied: ‘I have witnesses who saw Broekhof 
dragging my stuff to his own business, they can tell you that there were a lot more 
possessions than Broekhof claims’.201  
 In court, Broekhof told the judge that he purchased the possessions that the 
witnesses had seen him transporting. Broekhof then stated that it would not make 
any difference if he returned the possessions because ‘Joseph van der Stam is just 
starting his business and his old store is now occupied by another store’.202 Thus, the 
returned interior would not have made any difference. Broekhof’s second argument 
in court was that he offered van der Stam two different freezers for his meat. Van der 
Stam’s denial of this offer demonstrates that he did not need the interior possessions 
as much as he claimed he did.203 A third interesting argument Broekhof gave was 
that his company was more important for the recovery of the Dutch economy than 
any requirement for restitution: ‘In the interest of the Netherlands we should carry 
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on undisturbed’. 204   Broekhof delivered meat to important institutions, such as 
hospitals and psychiatric homes, whereas he felt that van der Stam would have to 
start from the bottom and therefore slow the economy’s growth.  
 Van der Stam asked for advice directly from the Board of Restitution. They 
told him that he had to start a summary proceeding at the Board of Restitution while 
waiting for the judgement. During the arguments before the board, it appeared that 
Broekhof’s company also felt cheated because there was a chance that he would lose 
his business. Van der Stam wrote about the situation: ‘When I came to the court, I 
saw Broekhof on the other side. The person who earned thousands and thousands of 
Dutch guilders during the war, is now feeling duped. Because the gamble he made 
during the war, when the Germans were in their heyday, now has turned so 
decidedly’.205 Finally, during the process, other agencies also started helping van der 
Stam to receive restitution. First, the abattoir who delivered meat to van der Stam 
was familiar with the pre-war possessions of van der Stam, and he was willing to 
testify. Second, a recovery bank wanted to guarantee the money that was needed for 
the lawsuit. A day before the judgment, van der Stam told the judge one more time 
how financially dependent he was on his former business. He explained that without 
his business, it was impossible to feed his family. The judge summarized the 
situation during the verdict. He stated that Broekhof tried to offer a low amount of 
money in exchange for the interior goods, however van der Stam denied the offer. 
The judge thought it was not very credible that Broekhof bought the new inventory 
for his store on the same day that van der Stam lost his possessions. Besides, an 
innocent man would not offer compensation for possessions he did not receive. 
Therefore, the judge stated that Broekhof bought the possessions from the Firma 
Inverma and Broekhof had to know that these possessions were ‘Jewish 
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possessions’.206   
 The judge stated in 1947 that Broekhof had to return all the missing 
possessions to van der Stam.  Moreover, for every day that Broekhof failed to return 
the possessions, he would pay a fine of 500 Dutch guilders to van der Stam. Later on, 
the van der Stam family opened a new store on the Reguliersbreestraat in 
Amsterdam and became one of the largest butchers in Amsterdam. They sold all 
kinds of foodstuff, in addition to meat. The name of the store changed in 1970, when 
it became a supermarket called: Galerie Mignon Supermarket.207 It is unknown when 
the butcher and later supermarket ceased to exist. 
 
D) Firma Alex Citroen (Small store) 
Directly after the liberation of Holland on 5 May 1945, Karel Citroen returned with 
his sisters and mother from one of several hiding places. His brother, who did not 
accompany them into hiding, was missing. The sisters immediately migrated to the 
United States of America after their experiences during the war. They moved in 
September 1945 because of a more flexible American migration quota. Karel and his 
mother, who were already in Amsterdam, tried to obtain restitution for the Firma 
Alex Citroen. It was not hard for Karel to restore his business and become its director 
again. Engels, the Verwalter, fled the country, enabling Citroen to immediately take 
over the business on the same day he returned. The Commission of Restitution 
agreed to the restitution because Karel proved that his name appeared in the trade 
registry of 1938-1939.208  
 The first thing Karel did was to appoint a lawyer, Becker, as the commissioner 
of the firm. Becker became very useful for the compensation lawsuits he later started. 
Next, he wanted to make sure that the Verwalter and SS’er, Engels, would be 
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punished for his collaboration with the Germans. This became clear from the three 
letters sent to the Political Investigation Team. In one letter, Karel Citroen wrote: ‘I 
don’t know where Engels is hiding, but he still has some captured possessions in his 
hands’.209 He ended that letter with: ‘Please can you arrest him, so I will get my 
possessions back and he can be deported’.210 Later, he sent two more letters where he 
asked for an arrest of the SS’er and administrator of his business. He needed to trace 
Engels, because if he did not find him, he could not claim compensation. 
Compensation was necessary because Karel Citroen gradually encountered more 
and more problems.  One difficulty began on 17 September 1945, when Firma 
Citroen received a letter informing the company that it had to pay 106,000 Dutch 
guilders for a compulsory security fee.211 It appeared that Engels was fired in 1944 
from the ownership group and that the German H.W. Nagel was the new Verwalter 
of the store. Nagel stopped keeping accounts and the store lost a lot of money. The 
post-war tax authorities wanted money while Citroen still was figuring out what 
happened to the money. This is an example of what Klein calls malicious taxes. He 
states that in many cases the government simply passed on overdue taxes to the 
restored Jewish owner that the previous administrator did not pay.212  This also 
happened to Firma Citroen. Such setbacks could be catastrophic for small businesses. 
Larger companies had greater equity and could sell property or holdings to pay for 
taxes, or they were even more likely to hire lawyers to contest the tax bills.  
  The post-war tax bills were almost catastrophic for the Firma Citroen. It 
appeared that after checking the existing balances, in April 1945, the store only had 
capital amounting to 2,000 Dutch guilders left. As Citroen mentions in the same 
letter: ‘Engels transferred an amount of 80,000 guilders cash to his own account’. The 
second owner, Nagel, also transferred 9,000 Dutch guilders to his own account. Thus, 
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it was impossible for Firma Citroen to pay the amount of money that the government 
requested for back taxes. As he wrote: ‘As you see, I cannot pay the taxes right now, 
it will be the complete end of the Firma Citroen, which can never be the intent.’213  
 The second problem started when Mathilde Citroen died in 1946. She owned 
some stocks. Becker, as the executor of the family, was aware of these difficulties, as 
was apparent from a letter sent by Becker to one of the sisters who moved after the 
war to New York.214 First, it was not listed how much capital and stocks Mathilde 
possessed before the war. Second, the mortgage of Mathilde’s immovable values was 
calculated from its value in 1940. Back then, the value of all their business properties 
was worth 60,000 guilders. However, because of damages from the Verwalters and 
from physical bombardments, the houses were worth far less than the remaining 
mortgages. Furthermore, the transfer of the stocks would be the biggest setback. This 
was because the stocks were not legally included in the will. Although the money 
that the stocks would generate would be divided among the family, the value of the 
stocks would be rated on the level of the post-war value of the stock. Therefore, 
Firma Citroen’s stocks were worth only 15% of their value in 1940. As Becker states: 
’It is not clear whether the Verwalters will return the estimated confiscated amount of 
stocks. If not, the value of the stocks will be even more unfavorable’.215 Fortunately, 
for the Firma Citroen, Engels paid back 60,000 Dutch guilders in 1947. This was very 
fortunate because according to the contact group of Jewish assets (a research group 
who investigated the restitution process between 1945 and 1960), which wrote a 
report in 1999, 15 percent of Jewish entrepreneurs’ stolen money was never repaid.216  
Until his retirement in 1977, Karel Citroen continued the firm. Unfortunately, no 
information is available about what happened with the store afterwards. 
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E) Firma Walg & Zn. (Micro store) 
In July 1945, soon after the end of WWII, Nathan Walg got his business back 
immediately. His son, Moses Walt, became one of the associates of the Firma Walg & 
Zn. Despite the return of their business, they saw that there were no liquid assets 
available. It appeared that their Verwalter, Beugel, deposited all the money from 
selling the business to one of the accounts of the Dutch Management Institute. As a 
reaction, the Walg family’s survivors tried to start a summary proceeding against 
Beugel and the Dutch Management Institute. Without retrieving this money, post-
war taxes could not be paid and Firma Walg & Zn. would be forced into bankruptcy. 
The attitude of the government to asking Jews to pay taxes for periods when they 
were in hiding or in death camps has been criticized extensively in recent years. Yet, 
at the time, the government did not respond to allegations from the Jewish 
community of implementing an unfair tax policy.217 The Management Institute that 
had the control over the money of Beugel tried to prevent any allegations against 
Beugel. As an argument for not starting a summary proceeding, the Management 
Institute said ‘we don’t see any harm of interest for the family Walg when the 
restitution of liquid assets is omitted’.218 Additionally, the Institute stated that very 
small transactions that had nothing to do with the firm were always paid from 
‘Beugel’s personal account’. This was why it was impossible to know what 
proportion the Walg family could claim. However, while the Management Institute 
tried to counter every Citroen allegation against Beugel, the Board of Restitution 
acted otherwise. Firma Citroen requested a summary proceeding in March 1946. 
During this procedure, it became discernible why the Management Institute wanted 
to cancel the lawsuit.  
 In 1943, the Germans consolidated all the fruit and vegetable traders in 
Amsterdam into one enormous supplier, the ‘Combination of Wholesalers in 
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Vegetables and Fruit, Amsterdam’ (abbreviation Crogo I).219 According to newspaper 
reports, the Germans actually performed this action because the well-known voucher 
system could work more efficiently when the providers worked together.220  The 
German government then decided during the war on which days certain vegetables 
could be sold and for what amount. All the received vouchers had to be submitted to 
the German government, so that they could investigate whether there was fraud.
 Every grocery store had to participate in this consolidation process and they 
all had to pay a fee. The contribution was calculated as a percentage of the 
businesses’ sales from previous years. However, Beugel claimed that he also paid 
money from his personal accounts to the Crogo. Therefore, it was impossible to 
deposit all the money from Crogo to the Firma Walg, because doing so would mean 
that Beugel could not financially survive. He was still the owner of some businesses 
that were important for the Dutch economy. Bankruptcy of these businesses would 
be detrimental for the Dutch economy.  
 Before the summary proceeding, the Dutch Management Institute proposed 
that the Crogo would refund all the money to Beugel’s account. After receiving his 
personal money, he would transfer the money to the Firma Walg. The Walg family 
responded by saying that ‘the Verwalter chose to invest and take leadership over our 
firm’.221 Furthermore, Beugel invested the money in the business of Firma Walg, and 
‘now it is our business again and thus our money’. As earlier mentioned, the risk for 
Walg was that they would not get their money back in a timely manner. Therefore, 
they would have to pay the post-war taxes from their personal bank accounts. This 
would be disastrous as there was no money left in their personal accounts because of 
the war.                   
 The Walg family asked the judge presiding over the case to decide that A) 
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Nathan Walg had to have all his rights reinstated, and also had to be granted the 
right to claim all money that Beugel deposited in Crogo’s account; and B) that the 
Dutch Management Institute was wrong and to demand that they accept the 
judgment of the court.222  
 The Management Institute was a state body. Thus, Firma Walg appealed the 
Dutch Management Institute’s decisions to a judicial court. Consequentially, the 
judge of that court said: ‘we cannot take any provision whereby we give the 
government any guidelines’.223 As mentioned earlier, the government, including the 
Dutch Management Institute, had the power to overrule all decisions of the court. 
The judge dismissed the case and Walg had to pay all the costs that came with the 
lawsuit. Summarizing, Firma Walg had to wait for the verdict of the Dutch 
Management Institute. All the efforts that were put into the court of justice were in 
vain because the Management Institute subsequently overruled the verdict of the 
judge. 
 The archives did not reveal whether the restitution of liquid assets continued 
and what the consequences of the judgment were for the company. Yet, newspapers 
between 1950 and 1958 still mention the Firma M.Walg&Zn.224 This may show that 
the firm won the appeal or had other solutions to pay taxes from the war period. 
Nathan Walg died in 1958, which heralded the end of the Firma M. Walg&Zn.225 
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F) Firma H.L. Granaat (Micro store) 
The war had fatal consequences for the Granaat family. From Levie’s nine children, 
only two survived, including Louis. He survived because he was married to a 
catholic woman. Out of the records appears that he lived in the apartment above his 
store during the war. The other pre-war owner, Samuel, tried to flee to America in 
1942. I drew this conclusion from the fact that he tried to arrange fake passports. 
However, because he was not successful, he had to report himself and his family in 
1943. From Amsterdam through Westerbork, they finally arrived in Sobibor where 
they were murdered in 1943. One of Samuel’s children, Cornelia Granaat, survived 
the war because she decided to go into hiding.      
Cornelia and Louis were the only surviving family members who were able to 
claim restitution and compensation. However, there is not a lot of information 
available about Firma Granaat in the period after the war. I will try to describe the 
period as best as possible. When Cornelia, the child of Samuel, came back after 
hiding, it appeared that she had post-traumatic stress syndrome because of the war. 
She married a German Jew who also survived and they moved to the United States. 
She never talked about her experiences during the war and it was never clear if she 
ever received any kind of restitution for the family business. If she did, the amount of 
restitution would not have been sufficient. Restitution for real estate was estimated 
based on the post-war value of the buildings. As the store experienced extensive 
damage due to Engels’ actions, the restitution amount would have been very low. 
 After the liberation of the Netherlands, it was easy for Louis to get his 
business back. As mentioned earlier, the confiscator Engels already returned to 
Germany in 1944 because of accusations of fraud. Therefore, there was nobody to 
obstruct Louis from retrieving his business when he returned to Amsterdam after the 
war. It appeared that the copper that he and his brother threw in the canal before the 
war was still there. The residual copper could be sold. In addition, Louis stocked a 
lot of the interior of the store in his own house during the war. That is why there are 
	85	
still some authentic goods available today.  
 The business’s stocks and equity totally evaporated during the war because of 
Engels’ actions. Louis had to start completely from scratch. Fortunately, the branding 
of the store that was built before the WWII helped him to survive the first years after 
the war. 
There is no information available of any claims of restitution made by the 
Granaat family survivors. However, it was possible for Cornelia and Louis to have 
held Engels liable for the damages done. This is because Firma Granaat bought 
stocks before the war in an American copper company. Engels had reported this to 
the German authorities; therefore, all the stocks were registered and transferred to 
Liro, a looted bank. As the stocks were registered, there was proof of stolen stocks. 
Consequentially, Firma Granaat could claim the stocks back from the V.V.R.A., who 
managed the deposit accounts. I hypothesize that Louis never went to court for any 
form of restitution or compensation. I assume this because there is no evidence of 
this in any archive, while the other stores mentioned had recorded these cases in 
detail. However, it is possible that Engels and Louis arranged a form of restitution 
together. They may have even done this while Engels lived in Germany because they 
were in contact during the war. This is because Louis lived above the store where 
Engels worked. Secondly, it is likely that Louis was busy restarting the store and 
believed there was no chance of attaining restitution for his stocks and the damage 
done to the company.  
 In 1952, Louis Granaat sold the store to the Kuiken family because there was 
no successor in his own family; one of his sons committed suicide in 1945 while 
another son became a famous painter. In the 1960s, Kuiken sold the firm to van 
Lissum. The family van Lissum still owns the buildings on the Oude Schans. They 
renovated everything, as can be seen in the appendix. Yet, the copper that Granaat 
once sold is still in storage, together with the old façade and old counters. Everybody 
is welcome to visit and see the old interior. 
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Conclusion 
The disadvantage of bureaucracy is that it limits a government’s flexibility to adapt to current 
conditions. They forget to empathize in specific situations.226 
As mentioned in the introduction several online memorial platforms have received 
serious criticisms. My case study will provide online platforms with new insights to 
both address and acknowledge these critiques and make the platforms more 
resilient. It will make online platforms capable of reflecting a more dynamic and 
broader story to prevent these critiques from arising in the future. The first point of 
criticism was that online platforms focused too much on one actor. The Jewish 
houses project will now be able to create maps that both include houses as well as 
stores on their virtual memorial platform. Secondly, researchers criticized existing 
online memorial initiatives in the sense that they provide an incomplete description 
of history, due to a narrow chronological focus on the war period. My thesis focused 
on the periods before and after the war in order to remedy this lack of information. 
In broadening the chronological scope, I create a fuller description of the persecution 
of Jewish shopkeepers during the Second World War. Thus, I explain the 
consequences and aftermath of these events. 
My first question was: how successful were Jewish entrepreneurs from Amsterdam 
on the eve of the war? 
Amsterdam was a place of significant economic activity among Jews before 
1930. Jews were represented in all kinds of sectors, from working in retail stores to 
owning grocery stores.  Most Jewish business traded vegetables, diamonds, or they 
were butchers. Their owners lived at a subsistence level, but could survive from the 
profit of their businesses. Some Jews had the chance to climb the socioeconomic 
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ladder. For example, companies like Gerzon and Metz&Co became famous for and 
accumulated wealth with their marketing and their stylish variety of products. 
However, this success was not for every Jew. Most Jews in Amsterdam lived on the 
edge of survival before the Second World War. Every Jewish store investigated in 
this study was affected by the economic crisis of 1929. Small- and micro-stores such 
as Citroen and van der Stam were more drastically affected than medium-sized 
stores. Gerzon and Metz&Co survived the financial crisis because of good 
management, while small- and micro-stores were on the verge of collapse. However, 
in the end all six of the investigated stores survived the economic crisis. The available 
records are unclear on whether Jewish stores suffered from increasing anti-Semitism 
in Dutch society in the period before 1940. Presumably, the stores already 
experienced antisemitism before the war. Antisemitism did not appear at a specific 
moment but gradually emerged. 
My second question was: what happened to the stores during and after the Second 
World War?  
 Directly after the war started, the owners of the medium-sized stores, Gerzon 
and Metz&Co, tried to ‘Aryanize’ their Board of Directors. They saw their own 
Jewish heritage as a risk to the longevity of the firm. The owners of the stores tried to 
change the board to non-Jews before the Germans could do so. The advantage from 
such a move was that a predefined contract could help the old Board of Directors to 
retake their position after the capitulation of Nazi Germany. 
The reasons vary as to why small- and micro-stores did not pursue any legal 
measures. First, owners of smaller stores were dependent on the incomes of their 
businesses. For the van der Stam family, the store was the provider of food, while the 
Jewish persons in the Board of Directors of Gerzon had sufficient money to flee to 
America. Furthermore, small and micro stores were owned by one or two persons 
and did not have the network or the capacity for such formal contractual take-overs. 
There is one example where a small business took preventative measures prior to 
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war.; these were the Granaat brothers, owners of the small business Firma Granaat. 
They tried to hide their belongings and predicted that copper would sink in the 
canal. This precaution cannot be characterized as a “formal construction” but as a 
bright and original idea of some individual shopkeepers. 
 The war was disastrous for all of the Jewish-owned stores described in my 
study. The German government ordered all the stores still in the hands of Jews to be 
Aryanized. The consequence was that the looted bank Lippmann & Co. received 
permission to confiscate the Jewish stores and hand ownership over to ‘Aryans’. The 
appointed confiscators of two of the investigated stores, Spiecker and Engels, sold 
their business later in the war to a third ‘Aryan’ party. In two other stores, an 
administrator ran the entire business until the end of the war. Regarding Gerzon, it is 
known that the looted bank Liro sold the main building to a third party. The 
verwalter Engels managed Firma Granaat until 1944. Between 1944 and 1945, the store 
closed. 
 For the six companies in my study, the consequences of personal persecution 
were disastrous. For example, in four of the firms, Gerzon, Citroen, van der Stam and 
Granaat, one or more of the named owners were killed by the Germans. Family 
members or acquaintances of all the storeowners died in Nazi concentration camps.  
 My third question is less relevant for the website of Jewish houses, but 
provides further insights into the historiographical debate regarding Jewish 
restitution in the Netherlands. In the following paragraphs, I will address the 
question: Given their disrupted business, was there a difference in compensation and 
restitution between small, medium and bigger stores?  
 During my study, I found no persuasive evidence that the size of a company 
played a decisive role in the restitution and compensation process. However, I found 
some indications that differences did exist. One of the indicators is that the economic 
positions of Gerzon and Metz&Co were relatively stronger after the war. Therefore, 
the restitution process was more extensive and effective because they had money to 
proceed. Micro- and small-sized stores struggled with collecting evidence for their 
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case and had a lack of money to pursue long legal processes.   
 A second indication is that Gerzon had connections and lawyers who helped 
the stores to be well prepared for lawsuits. While small and micro-stores had neither 
advisors nor sounding boards, Gerzon and Metz&Co could discuss the procedure 
with their board of governance contacts and outside experts.  
 Thirdly, the evidence indicates that it was disastrous for small and micro-
stores if the owner died during the war. The reason for this is that if the sole owner 
died, a descendant who had no experience of running a business had to claim for 
restitution (e.g. David van der Stam). Medium-sized stores, by contrast, had a Board 
of Directors and therefore consisted of and had access to a larger network of people 
with an understanding of the way to claim restitution. Therefore, medium-sized 
stores were better positioned to claim future restitution than the descendants of small 
and micro-stores.   
 A fourth indicator relates to the government’s bureaucratic attitude. While 
Jewish owners lost all their possessions and various family members during the 
Second World War, unpaid taxes had to be paid immediately. For small stores, such 
as Walg and Citroen, this imperative was critical. Not only was their financial 
position precarious after the Second World War, but they had to wait for the 
restitution of the liquid assets before being able to even pay taxes. Because the 
government did not cater to each business’s situations, Walg and Citroen began with 
lawsuits to obtain postponement of paying taxes before starting lawsuits for the 
restitution of their assets.  
While these are some indications that business size mattered, I do not want to 
claim that it was the decisive factor. Every case is so self-contained and unique that it 
is difficult to draw general conclusions. For example, I also elaborate upon 
differences between the medium stores. Presumably, this is because other factors also 
played a crucial role, such as the personal differences between the appointed 
confiscators. I conclude that the following factors concerning the confiscator of the 
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store could have influenced the restitution process: 1) their origins 2) decisions 3) 
money management and 4) willingness to negotiate.  
Origins 
To start, whether the administrator had Dutch or German origins was an important 
factor. When the Verwalter was not physically present during the trial because of their 
flight to Germany, the administrator was proven guilty without a lawsuit. This was 
true for the Metz&Co and Firma Citroen businesses, as their administrators were 
German. Because these Germans were occupiers, they were automatically guilty for 
their participation in the occupation of Holland. However, if the Verwalter was 
Dutch, the Jewish owners had to exert much more effort.  Thus, the lawsuits took 
longer when the Dutch administrators were present. The Jewish owners had to prove 
that the administrators bought the stores in bad faith. The administrators were 
innocent until proven otherwise according to the law. For example, Jozeph van der 
Stam had to prove that his administrator confiscated his belongings. Another 
example is that Gerzon had to prove that the Verwalter took a mortgage from one of 
its buildings. 
Decisions  
 Secondly, the decisions made by the administrator during the war were important. 
An example of a decision of the administrator that had consequences for the 
restitution process later on was that two of the firms, Gerzon and Citroen, were sold 
to a third party later in the war. The restitution lawsuit thus targeted multiple 
people. Firma Gerzon and Citroen had to prove the guilt of all of those involved. 
Ultimately, the more parties that were involved in the restitution process, the longer 
and more complicated the process became. 
Money management 
The administrator’s money management, thirdly, influenced the outcome of the 
restitution and compensation process. While some firms received all the money 
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rightfully back, other Verwalters deposited money into their personal accounts. 
Therefore, Metz&Co, Firma Citroen and Firma Walg could not retrieve all of their 
money. It was unclear if and how much money was illegally withdrawn from the 
firm and how much was a normal operational loss.  
Willingness to negotiate 
The willingness of the Verwalter to negotiate was the fourth factor that influenced the 
process. I have found that it was possible that administrators’ personal circumstances 
influenced their position in negotiations. For example, the Verwalter of Metz&Co lost 
her husband directly after the war. She agreed with every restitution proposal and 
did not counteract any claim. The administrator of the Firma David van der Stam 
was financially dependent on the store, which may explain why he did not want to 
return the store to the formal owner. The Verwalter of the Firma Granaat had already 
left the Netherlands in 1944. Therefore, Louis Granaat did not have to retrieve his 
store because nobody else claimed his possessions.  
 In sum, my thesis reveals a number of important factors that were necessary 
for Jewish entrepreneurs to successfully obtain restitution after the Second World 
War.  
1) the owners or their family members had to have survived the Holocaust and 
needed to be willing to make claims, as some survivors just wanted to migrate to 
forget their recent traumas. 
2) the chance of success increased if the Verwalter/administrator was German and/or 
a clear collaborator. This prevented the Jewish entrepreneur from asking additional 
questions about the residence of the Verwalter and whether the Verwalter received the 
assets in good faith. 
3) the Verwalter’s personal circumstances and decisions during and after the war 
influenced the process of restitution. Examples are the channeling of money to their 
own accounts or the resale of the store. 
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4) all persons or business owners in my study had to possess sufficient capital to 
proceed with their case as it often took years to solve, while also being enforced to 
pay taxes in the meantime for wartime expenses despite their obvious absence. 
However, the available capital improved the possibility of a higher amount of 
restitution. The bigger the company, the higher chance that they had access to 
money, property, and assets, which could help to survive the protracted procedures. 
Presumably, smaller business accepted less compensation immediately because they 
could not afford to wait. 
 To conclude, I have three suggestions for future research. Firstly, one of my 
main findings is that different factors concerning the confiscator influenced the 
outcome of the restitution process. Therefore, future research should focus on 
whether there are more factors that explain the differences in the administrator’s 
influence during the restitution process. Secondly, future research should focus on 
geographical differences in restitution cases. While historiography nowadays mostly 
compares differences per country, I have shown that differences in receiving 
restitution existed within the city of Amsterdam. Geographical research can produce 
new insights in the restitution debate and focusing on important cities and regions 
can highlight a more human dimension than focusing on the national level and the 
state.  
Thirdly, future online platforms should focus on individual cases of Jewish 
experiences instead of seeing the Jews as an entity. In contrast with most of the 
historiography, my research shows that there are many commonalities between the 
different experiences, but also some differences. The interchangeability of the stories 
will help people to seek an individual story to which they can relate to and connect 
with on a deeper level, since it is closer to their personal circumstances and life 
experiences. Presumably, these stories can create empathy while respectfully 
commemorating the war’s tragedies.   
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